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Abstract 
 This thesis explores how different models of refugee resettlement influence refugee 
integration outcomes. Currently, the US offers two primary models: sponsorship through a 
voluntary agency with support from a community group, typically a religious congregation. 
Private sponsorship, or unaffiliated volunteering with refugees also occurs locally across the 
United States. Previous literature largely addresses the challenges of case-management model in 
facilitating refugee integration, but does not assess how U.S. community-driven approaches to 
resettlement affect refugees’ economic and linguistic outcomes. In the first section, this thesis 
examines the history of refugee resettlement in Connecticut through refugee admissions data, 
organizational analysis of the states’ principle resettlement agencies, and the Hartford area’s 
municipal involvement with resettlement. I find that Catholic Charities, Connecticut’s largest 
case-management agency, has been ineffectual in its past initiatives in resettling refugees. In 
total, I conduct twenty-two interviews with case-managers, community volunteers and Syrian 
refugees. Overall, my findings suggest that community and private sponsorship (largely based in 
West Hartford) enhances refugee families’ social capital, and, in turn, economic, linguistic, and 
social integration. At the same time, this phenomenon of largely privileged suburbanites helping 
individual refugee families achieve mobility perpetuates systems of metropolitan inequality.  
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Introduction 
On January 28, 2017, thousands of protestors crowded Hartford’s Bradley International 
Airport and airports across the country to denounce President Donald Trump’s first travel ban, 
which included a 120-day refugee ban from seven majority-Muslim countries and an indefinite 
ban on Syrian refugees. While a federal circuit court ruling blocked this executive order from 
going into effect on February 3rd, 2017, President Trump’s subsequent two travel bans 
heightened security measures and de facto entrance criterion significantly reducing the United 
States refugee admissions from 85,000 in 2016 to only a projected 45,000 in 2018 (Bernstein and 
DuBois, 9, 2018). In fact, for FY 2018 a total of 22,491 refugees were resettled in the United 
States under this ceiling of 45,000 (Rush 2018). For FY 2019, Trump has set an even lower 
refugee ceiling of 30,000 potential admissions (Bernstein and Santos 2018). These restrictive 
actions have led to budget cuts resulting in national refugee resettlement voluntary agencies 
(volags) closing local offices and laying off staff (Alvarez 2018). While the Trump 
Administration’s policies have adversely impacted the linguistic, cultural and financial resources 
of local volags, it remains unclear if national decision-making has affected local community 
involvement in refugee integration.  
Clearly, refugee resettlement in the United State is under attack. But evidence suggests 
that refugees tend to economically and linguistically integrate successfully over time (Bernstein 
2018 and Capps et al 2018). Indeed, the Obama administration was ramping up refugee 
resettlement in its final years (Bernstein, 2018, 7). With worldwide refugee populations at an all-
time high (UNHCR 2018), it is worth considering how the United States can employ its 
resources to engage in refugee resettlement more effectively. Currently the US offers two 
primary models: sponsorship through a voluntary agency with regular support from a case 
	 7 
worker, and sponsorship through a voluntary agency with support from a community group, 
typically a faith-based organization. Private sponsorship, or non-affiliated volunteering with 
refugees, also occurs locally across the United States. In other words, private volunteers assist 
refugees without the supervision or coordination of a voluntary resettlement agency. Volag case-
management and community-driven sponsorship seek to assist refugees in their transition and 
acculturation to the United States. Through interviews and analysis in Greater Hartford, CT, this 
thesis examines how these two approaches to resettlement affect refugees’ social capital and 
integration outcomes. The findings will suggest that community sponsorship and private 
sponsorship enhance refugee families’ social capital and, in turn, economic, linguistic, and social 
integration. At the same time, however, the phenomenon of largely privileged suburbanites 
helping individual refugee families achieve mobility perpetuates systems of metropolitan 
inequality. Specifically, individual refugee families receive support to flee or subvert struggling 
urban neighborhoods and schools, taking with them the skills and entrepreneurial spirit that 
immigrants often bring. In a society riddled with systemic inequalities, the bridging social capital 
that sponsorship creates plucks select families from urban poverty, while reinforcing the 
processes of flight that trouble communities such as Hartford.   
Discussion of traditional voluntary agency case work is not new in scholarly literature. 
Nor indeed are discussions of the role of faith-based refugee co-sponsorship. However, scholars 
continue to disagree over definitions, factors and determinants of refugee integration. In fact, the 
United States Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) does not even provide an official definition 
of integration on its website. Furthermore, much scholarship neglects the fact that U.S. refugee 
resettlement programs have offered little information on long-term refugee integration outcomes. 
Specifically, researchers lack information regarding non-economic integration outcomes such as 
	 8 
English-language proficiency, civic and community involvement and psychosocial wellbeing.  In 
addition, the highly localized nature of refugee services creates a large gap of research 
concerning how community members, religious congregations and volag caseworkers determine 
refugee integration outcomes across the United States. In this introduction, I first provide a brief 
overview of the history, and objectives of the United States Refugee Resettlement Program 
(USRP). Next, I discuss the efficacy of co-sponsorship and volag casework models in promoting 
refugee integration outcomes. To assess these models, I track the available information and gaps 
of knowledge regarding refugee integration outcomes from major American research institutes, 
think-tanks and academics. Within this section, I also focus on the role of social capital in 
bridging access to refugees’ economic, linguistic and social integration.  
Overview of United States Refugee Resettlement  
 According to the United Nations 1951 Refugee Convention, a refugee is someone who 
has been forced to flee his or her country because of persecution, war or violence (Convention 
Relating to the Status of Refugees 1951). A refugee has a well-founded fear of persecution for 
reasons of race, religion, nationality, political opinion or membership in a particular social group 
(United Nations Refugee Convention 1951). Currently, there are approximately 68.5 million 
people around the world who have been forced from their home (UNHCR: 2018). Among them 
are nearly 25.4 million refugees, over half of whom are under the age of 18 (UNHCR: USA 
2018). Fifty-seven percent of these refugees come from three countries: Syria (6.3 million), 
Afghanistan (2.6 million) and South Sudan (2.4 million) (UNHCR: USA 2018).  
The Immigration and Nationality Act and the Refugee Act of 1980 grant refugees’ entry 
into the United States. For each federal year, the President determines the refugee ceiling, which 
does not have to be met, but cannot be exceeded (Bernstein, 3, 2018).  Historically, the total 
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number of refugees coming to the United States has fluctuated along with global events and U.S. 
priorities (Krogstad and Radford 2017). For instance, United States presidents prioritized 
accepting thousands of Cuban and Vietnamese refugees in the 1970s and 1980s due to their 
Cold-War deterrence policies. From 1990 to 1995, for instance, an average about 112,000 
refugees arrived in the U.S. each year, with many coming from the former Soviet Union 
(Krogstad and Radford 2017). However, refugee admissions dropped off to fewer than 27,000 in 
2002 following the terrorist attacks in 2001 (Krogstad and Radford 2017). This number has since 
risen under the Obama Administration, and dropped again within the context of President 
Trump’s restrictive migration policies. According to Kallick and Mathema (2016), refugees 
consist of approximately 8 percent of all foreign-born individuals in the United States. When 
selected to enter the United States, refugees must go through an intensive security screening 
process by the United States Department of Homeland Security which can last years. When 
granted admission, refugees undergo cultural training before departure.  
The United States resettlement program is a public-private program that is run by the 
Department of State Bureau of Population, Refugees, and Migration (PRM) and the US 
Department of Health and Human Services Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR). These 
organizations distribute funds and cases to nine national, mostly religious-based resettlement 
agencies (“volags”) that provide services to newly arrived refugees through a network of local 
affiliates in communities across the United States. PRM funds short-term services for 30 to 90 
days, which are used to cover expenses for refugees’ immediate needs including reception at the 
airport, housing and clothes and enrollment in social services (Bernstein and Dubois, 3, 2018). 
This amount of cash is minimal - $2,075 for each refugee in FY 2018 and is often supplemented 
by community groups, volunteers or private donations (Bernstein and Dubois, 3, 2018). Refugees 
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also have access to federal government benefits, including Medicaid, Temporary Assistance for 
Needy Families, food stamps or Supplemental Nutrition Assistance Program. That being said, 
benefits greatly differ from state to state.  
Criticisms of the Volag Case-Management Resettlement Model  
Despite volags’ resettlement purpose, there are still many unresolved challenges to 
promoting refugee integration and self-sufficiency. In the first month, volag case-managers assist 
refugees in meeting critical needs (housing selection and furnishing, airport pickup and 
assignment of welfare/social security cards). Simultaneously, case-managers search for any job 
opportunities for their refugee clients. Once a job has been assigned, caseworkers focus on ESL 
tutoring or classes so refugees can improve their English-speaking abilities. After spending one 
year in the United States, refugees are required to apply for lawful permanent residence card. 
The main problems in successful refugee integration are the limited resettlement time period of 
90 days, and national funding. Volag employees face the immense challenge of transforming 
refugees into economically-sufficient and English-proficient citizens in under 3 months. With 
diminished national funds, caseworker resources are stretched and this ambitious goal is 
tempered. Both these factors affect economic self-sufficiency and English language attainment: 
the two main goals of United States refugee resettlement program (USRP).  
 In terms of employment, refugees are given jobs immediately whether or not this job fits 
the refugees’ needs or credentials. This policy is consistent with USRP’s goal of decreasing 
refugees’ public benefit usage. Therefore, many refugees are underemployed or posses jobs 
which under-matches their skill-set. Due to the limited resettlement time period, refugees 
generally cannot wait for an ideal job to come up and usually take whatever opportunity comes 
first (Rana 2016). For instance, researchers studying resettlement in the Atlanta area, 
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Connecticut and Ohio, found that many refugees were sent to work at a chicken factories 
regardless of their level of education, experience or training (Rana, 2016, 71). While this type of 
labor provides refugees with a temporary job, a Georgetown Human Rights Institute review 
(2009) found that the USARP does not devote enough attention to breaking down key barriers to 
long-term employment for refugees. This is partially because employment services, provided by 
volags and state agencies do not receive enough national funding to adequately help refugees in 
their job search (Georgetown Human Rights Institute 2009). In an interview with Belmin Pinjic, 
the Director of Refugee Services at Lutheran Social Services of Michigan (LSSM), he states, 
“We need more funding, that’s the key” (Georgetown Human Rights Institute, 2009). In addition 
to lack of employment services, many casework volags do not provide refugees with adequate 
English language classes or training.  
Legally, however, U.S. refugee regulations set aside specific funding for English 
language training and require that it be provided to the maximum extent feasible in manner that 
is linguistically and culturally compatible with a refugee’s background (Georgetown Institute of 
Human Rights, 2009, 71). Capps et al (2017) and Bernstein (2018) emphasize that limited 
English skills can slow refugee economic integration or accessibility to certain jobs. USRP’s 
emphasis of employment, however, compromises refugees’ availability to attend English classes. 
Refugees’ lack of transportation or disparate access to public transit also complicates scheduling 
ESL classes. In addition, the minimal government support for USRP language services may be 
insufficient to meet the needs of refugee groups (Capps et al 2017). In Detroit, Georgetown 
students found that LSSM only has only enough funding to start new ESL courses every four 
months. Therefore, newly-arrived refugees wait about four months before starting English 
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classes. In addition, there are only 325 seats available, which only allows a minority of the 
refugee population to be enrolled (Georgetown Institute of Human Rights, 2009, 71).  
In addition to employment and language acquisition, an overarching goal of USRP is to 
encourage refugee’s community involvement, which is often truncated by the caseworker’s work 
load and 90-day time period.  Indeed, the refugee resettlement program contains a number of 
ambitious integration goals to be achieved within a volag’s short three-month period. 
Furthermore, refugee participants sometimes feel that their caseworkers could not always 
provide enough time for them because of their caseload (Rana, 2016). Consequently, participants 
suggested that agencies should hire more caseworkers to assist the refugee clients. In addition, 
they recommended that an average of six months (180 days) would be an ideal time for 
resettlement given the different circumstances each refugee case came from or faced during 
resettlement (Rana, 2016).  Simply put, a three-month resettlement period is not realistic given 
the enormity of USRP’s language and employment goals. Given the Trump Administration’s 
dismantling of the refugee program, however, it is unlikely that local volags will be given more 
time, support or resources to assist refugees. 
Private and Community Sponsorship of Refugees   
 Refugee sponsorship arrangements take many forms depending on the context and 
capacity of receiving countries. In Canada, the Private Sponsorship of Refugees (PSR) program, 
allows private individuals, community organizations, and nonprofits to select refugees for 
resettlement in addition to the government resettlement system (Fratzke 2017). Comparatively, 
the United States has no national policy of private-sponsorship and is a private-public 
partnership, which utilizes volags’ local resources. This is not to say that private volunteering or 
sponsorship of refugees does not occur, but these initiatives do not effect U.S. refugee 
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admissions. Similarly, in European countries ad hoc initiatives which incorporate elements of 
private-sponsorship such as Refugees Welcome programs, have largely emerged since 2013 
(Fratzke 2017). A variation of private-sponsorship, community-based sponsorship refers to the 
informal and formal community networks or groups which support refugee families. Canadian 
policy-studies have shown that community-driven approaches provide added value to refugee 
resettlement including improved refugee labor market integration, self-sufficiency and 
opportunities to build meaningful relationships between refugees and receiving communities 
(Fratzke 2017). Specifically, this data on refugee economic outcomes have consistently shown 
that privately sponsored refugees find employment more quickly, receive more income from 
work, and are less likely to use public benefits than government-supported refugees (Ottawa: 
IRCC, 2016). Additionally, Fratzke proposes that sponsorship can also serve as a way to build 
social connections and acceptance between refugees and their new neighbors (Fratzke 2017). 
While Canada has empirically demonstrated the effectiveness of sponsorship, the United States’ 
casework and co-sponsorship resettlement models have not been thoroughly accessed.  
Most academic articles concerning co-sponsorship of refugees in the United States, 
therefore, center on the informal role of churches and religious groups. With domestic and 
international networks, a wide volunteer base and an organizational charity structure, religious 
groups are valuable partners and institutions of community-based refugee sponsorship. 
According to Ives et al (2009): 
In communities across the US, churches, synagogues and other religious groups have been among the most 
consistent supporters of refugee resettlement by engaging in refugee co-sponsorship. Their durability in 
communities is an asset for refugee resettlement agencies. Large congregations that co-sponsor refugee 
arrivals can often be relied upon to do so over and over again (Ives et al, 593, 2009).  
 
Historically, faith-based organizations (FBOs) have provided a significant amount of 
social service in the United States (Wineburg 1992). The breadth of activity in which FBOs 
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engage includes education, services for immigrants and refugees, employment support, and 
advocacy. In a study conducted by Cnaan et al (2004), researchers found that the average annual 
social service replacement value of an average Philadelphia congregation is estimated at 
$117,852.72. While this study was solely based on Philadelphia, it underscores the immense 
amount of additional funding and resources that churches can provide to communities. Given the 
extent of congregational involvement and sheer volume of congregations in America (estimates 
range from 250,000 to 400,000), congregations serve as an indispensable channel for social 
service.  
In relation to refugees, congregation members provide a number of volunteer roles and 
responsibilities including, but not limited to: furnishing apartments, buying groceries and clothes, 
transporting parents to work, enrolling children in school and providing information for 
government services (Ives et al 2009). In addition to this material assistance, congregational co-
sponsorship provides refugees with long-lasting resettlement relationships. These relationships 
and interactions with the local community are vital to refugees’ resettlement outcomes and 
integration. In a study analyzing refugees in Richmond, Virginia, researchers found how 
Richmond religious organizations and sponsors have provided an exceptional amount of critical 
support for refugees during their initial resettlement phase (Breslow et al 1997). In turn, refugees 
in Richmond contributed a great deal to the greater Richmond community not only in social and 
cultural, but also in economic terms.  
In effect, religion motivates and sustains volunteers as a method of exploring and 
expressing their own faith (Wineburg 1992, Nawyn 2016 and Eby et al 2011). Boezeman and 
Ellemers (2008) noted that volunteers engaged in service delivery exhibited higher levels of 
normative commitment than employees in for-profit organizations. Baumeister and Leary (1995) 
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also contend that volunteering offers more opportunities than paid work to deepen resettlement 
relationships and commitment. In asking participants about their roles in refugee resettlement, 
community members responded that their role was “exhausting” and sometimes “never-ending” 
(McCallum, 960, 2018). This level of commitment, thus enables volunteers to conform better to 
refugees’ needs outside of a demanding 90-day time period.  
Volunteers’ connections to the community allow refugees to become better integrated 
into the host society. This social capital may provide refugees opportunities to attain better 
employment and English-speaking skills compared to volags’ traditional case-management 
approach. To an extent, refugee co-sponsorship overcomes two of the main obstacles of 
casework resettlement: lack of funding and resources and the 90-day time limit. United States 
community co-sponsorship, therefore, may provide refugees with longer-term commitment, 
additional sources of financial and social capital.  Additionally, this co-sponsorship approach 
allows community members to become more involved in refugee resettlement, perhaps 
promoting acceptance and tolerance of new populations.  
Evidence and Theories of Refugee Integration  
Scholars largely disagree over determinants of refugee integration. For instance, Ager 
and Strang (2008) propose that refugees achieve integration via a ten-part framework which 
includes many interacting factors such as employment, housing, education, health, 
citizenship/rights and social connection, to name a few. While this approach is more holistic, 
other scholars emphasize the role of certain factors in determining long-term refugee integration 
outcomes. Specifically, refugee integration literature disputes the roles of economic mobility and 
social integration. Economic mobility is defined broadly as the ability of an individual, family or 
group to improve their economic status. Not surprisingly, the United States’ capitalist economy 
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emphasizes the importance of migrant economic independence and contribution. Therefore, 
welfare usage, employment and income-level constitutes perhaps the most researched area of 
refugee integration. Conversely, linguistic, educational, and psycho-social refugee integration 
outcomes remain less studied. Prior to assessing these areas of post-migration, I will briefly 
assess some of the challenges associated with collecting and analyzing refugee data.  
Challenges of Refugee Data  
Most current information on refugee integration is largely drawn from Census Bureau 
data, primarily the decennial census and the annual American Community Survey (ACS) 
(Bernstein, 2018, 10). Researchers also rely on other national surveys such as the New 
Immigrant Survey and Annual Survey of Refugees or administrative information from databases 
such as the Worldwide Refugee Admissions Processing System (WRAPS) (Bernstein, 2018, 10). 
Indeed, collecting refugee data is not easy given the vulnerable status of refugees, their small 
population and geographic dispersion, and diversity in terms of language and demographic 
background (Bernstein, 2018, 10). While these national and administrative sources offer large 
refugee samples, they do not always address local policies or nuances of refugee resettlement.  
Overall, however, recent research has found that over time, refugees integrate in the 
United States in terms of economic well-being. However, integration information concerning 
English proficiency and educational attainment varies widely based upon country of origin, age 
of arrival, gender and educational background (Bernstein, 2018, 10). Unfortunately, the Census 
does not measure factors such as refugee social capital, community involvement or health 
(Bernstein, 2018, 10). Below, available evidence concerning refugee integration is organized into 
two different categories: (1) economic and (2) linguistic, education and psycho-social outcomes.  
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Economic Outcomes 
Economically, several studies found that upon arriving, refugees were more likely to 
receive public welfare than native-born Americans; however, their reliance on benefits decrease 
as their time in the United States increases (Capps et al 2015, Kerwin 2018; Bernstein and 
DuBois 2018). Despite initial costs, Evans and Fitzgerald (2017) also find that refugee 
contributions outweigh public benefits usage. This is partially due to the fact that finds that 77 
percent of refugees are of working-age (25 to 64), as compared to 50 percent of the native-born 
population (NAE 2017).  Compared to native-born American men, refugee men have higher 
labor participation rates, which increase over time in the United States (Kerwin 2018 and 
Bernstein and Dubois 2018). Refugee women participate in the labor force at a rate as high as 
native-born women (Capps et al 2015). Clearly, refugees economically revitalize and contribute 
to their communities. This revitalization and contribution can also be seen in refugees’ increasing 
incomes with more time in the United States. On average, income increases with more time in 
the United States with median incomes $31,000 higher for long-term (20 years) refugees (Capps 
et al 2015). That being said, refugees’ median wages rise with more time in the United States, 
but remain lower than native-born wages even for refugees with 20 years in the country (Evans 
and Fitzgerald 2017).  
While refugees are integrating economically, Fix, Hooper, and Zong (2017) find that 
underemployment is a very critical issue for several refugee groups interviewed. That is, 
refugees tend to get jobs that are not full-time or reflective of their training, education or 
financial needs. Specifically, half of Iraqi (48 percent), Cuban (44 percent), and Burmese (40 
percent) refugees are underemployed compared to 18 percent of the native born population (Fix 
Hooper and Zong 2017).  The U.S. resettlement program’s emphasis on getting refugees jobs 
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quickly and on a tight budgets may leave very little room for finding higher-quality jobs. 
Unfortunately, the US Census does not track evolving job acquisition; therefore, many 
policymakers do not consider refugee underemployment.   
 Linguistic, educational and psycho-social outcomes  
Kerwin (2018) finds that refugees bring linguistic diversity to the United States which 
can promote competitiveness and security. From the 1980s to 19902, the number of refugee 
nationalities rose steadily, as refugees come from an average of 66 different countries annually. 
While refugees gain English proficiency with time in the United States, fifty-eight percent of 
refugees with more than 20 years of U.S. residence remained Limited English proficient (Capps 
et al 2015 and Bernstein and Dubois 2018). The lack of literacy in a first language impedes 
English-language acquisition (Capps et al 2015). This is especially true for refugees whose 
languages are not written, but oral, including groups such as Somali-Bantu or Sgaw Karen 
speakers. Overall, language acquisition continues to be a pervasive and understudied issue in 
refugee employment, integration and resettlement literature.  
Educationally, adult refugees are just as likely as U.S. natives to hold at least a bachelor’s 
degree (Fix et al 2017). That being said, levels of educational attainment differ between refugee 
groups. For instance, 60 percent of refugee men and women from Russia, Iran and Ukraine hold 
bachelor’s degrees (Capps et al).  Comparatively, 42 percent of men and 56 percent of women 
from Bhutan have not completed high school (Capps et al 2015).  Because education is a 
predictor of successful integration and income, this puts a number of refugee populations at a 
disadvantage.  
 In addition to linguistic and educational outcomes, refugee’s psycho-social adaptation, 
which focuses on the influence of post-migration factors on refugee mental well-being, is also a 
	 19 
necessary framework for understanding refugee integration. Many journal articles focused on the 
psycho-social acculturation of Vietnamese refugees finds that post-settlement adjustment 
(employment, linguistic abilities) have a positive effect on refugee psycho-social integration 
(Kim 2015, Birman Tran 2008, Ngo 2001; Nicassio 1983). For instance, Ngo (2001) and 
Nicassio (1983) found that English language use moderated the positive relationship between pre 
migration traumatic experiences and higher depression. Conversely, lack of English-speaking 
skills was associated with higher anxiety and depression for refugees (Birman and Tran 2008; 
Nicassio 1983). Furthermore, in a study evaluating mental health outcomes among Latino and 
Asian refugees in the United States, Kim (2015) found that refugees who were not in the labor 
force were significantly associated with mood disorders. Overall, all of these articles find that 
post-resettlement traumas such as underemployment and/or lack of English-speaking skills are 
significantly associated with refugee psychosocial health and integration.  
Social Capital Theory and Refugee Integration 
In these studies, employment has been consistently identified as a factor associated with 
meeting members of the host society, developing linguistic skills and promoting a sense self-
reliance and belonging (Bloch 1999 and Tomlinson and Egan 2002). Nonetheless, many of the 
above studies do not recognize the interdependent and interacting nature of economic mobility 
and social integration. In fact, Fratzke (2017) is one of the few studies which demonstrates this 
important relationship in Canada. Social integration refers to the process during which 
newcomers or minorities are incorporated into the social structures of the host society. In 
resettlement, refugees’ social links are ruptured and newcomers must forge new connections 
within their communities. Social capital, or the focus on social relations providing productive 
benefits, is integral to successful refugee integration and outcomes. 
	 20 
Social capital is a term that has been intermittently referenced prior and during the early 
20th century, but popularized in the 1990s. Alex de Tocqueville (1805-1859) was a French 
diplomat famous for his work Democracy in America. In Democracy for America, Tocqueville 
describes how the level of social participation (social capital) in America society facilitated 
equality across socio-economic boundaries. L.J Hanifan, a school reformer during the 
Progressive era, is credited for officially coining the term “social capital” in an article regarding 
social support for rural schools. Later in the twentieth century, Glenn Loury (1977) provided the 
first generally recognized application of the concept to explain economic performance more 
clearly. Sociologists James Coleman and Barry Wellman and Scott Wortley adopted Glenn 
Loury’s definition in developing and popularizing the concept (Castle 2002).  Bourdieu (1985) 
also discusses this concept and viewed it as a durable social network that enables individuals to 
gain access to resources. The most modern application of the theory, however, is credited to 
Robert Putnam, an American academic of political science. In Bowling Alone: The Collapse and 
Revival of American Community, Putnam surveys the deterioration of social capital or 
connection between Americans since the 1950s. According to Putnam and his followers, social 
capital is a key component to building and maintain democracy, or civic engagement. Putnam 
also suggests how changes in social policy, technology and equality affect social capital, and 
emphasizes the importance of discovering how Americans can reverse the deterioration of social 
capital.  
Migrant, and refugee social capital can be broken into three different frameworks: 
bonding, bridging and linking capital. Bonding capital refers to the various ways refugees 
develop relationships within their ethnic groups (Xin, 233, 2018). Bridging capital refers to the 
ways in which refugees adopted to their resettlement countries by reaching out to people with a 
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different ethnic background (Xin, 234, 2018). Finally, linking capital refers to the way groups 
and people are brought together in a hierarchy where power, social status and wealth are brought 
together (Xin, 234, 2018). Indeed, all three of these social capital frameworks are useful in 
understanding how refugees utilize social networking to attain employment, ESL or educational 
opportunities.  
Surprisingly, however, there are very few articles on the effect of social capital on 
refugee integration in the United States. However, Lamba and Krahn (2003) found that in 
Canada, refugees possessed extensive stocks of social capital, even though most were also 
severely lacking in financial capital and many could not use their human capital to obtain 
satisfactory employment (Lambda and Krahn 2003). Additionally, Xin (2018) found that in 
Canada, the United States and the United Kingdom that refugees were highly engaged in their 
own ethnic communities through their immediate family members, friends and relatives, ethnic 
churches, community interest groups, community and social events and Facebook. Lamba’s 
study along with others revealed a strong relationship between refugees’ stocks of bonding 
(intra-ethnic) social capital and the quality of their employment (Lamba and Krahn 2003 and 
Breslow et al 2000). In contrast, Breslow et al (2000) focuses on showing the extent to which 
refugees’ extra-familial connections play in obtaining refugee employment. Different from 
Lamba and Fratzke’s analyses, this study demonstrates how refugees’ social relationships within 
their own communities may facilitate economic integration. This does not account for how 
refugees’ co-sponsorship relationships, or bridging social capital, influences their integration.    
Not only does social capital factor into refugees’ personal connections, but United States’ 
volag caseworker’s ability to provide opportunities for refugees. Using economic modeling and 
International Rescue Committee (IRC) data, Beaman (2012) finds that the number of social 
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network members resettled in the same year or one year prior leads to the deterioration of 
refugee employment outcomes. Therefore, the increase and accessibility of casework volags' 
social capital networks correlates with refugees' employment opportunities. In relation to 
Beaman’s findings, scholars have found that host community organizations, such as 
congregations, restore refugees’ social ties that have been disrupted through resettlement (Ives et 
al. 2010; Eby et al 2011; Breslow et al. 1997). These studies also found that the integration of 
congregations in their communities can provide opportunities of employment, language training 
and for refugees. Therefore, the literature would suggest that the size and strength of refugee 
social capital is associated with refugee resettlement and integration outcomes.   
While researchers understand how refugees’ personal characteristics (i.e. age, literacy, 
education-level) influence integration outcomes, there is limited information about how different 
resettlement models influence outcomes. Though migration scholars greatly discuss post-
migration factors and social capital, there also exists a gap when it comes to the application of 
social capital theory to casework volags, community sponsorship organizations and private 
volunteering networks. As discussed, the later two models of resettlement are historically 
relevant in the United States given congregations’ long-standing involvement in refugee 
resettlement. Due to the informal and local nature of religious congregations, the main location 
of refugee co-sponsorship, there exists very little or sporadic data assessing this model’s 
influence on integration outcomes. This thesis intends to fill this gap by illuminating the role of 
social capital networks in refugee casework volags, congregational co-sponsorship, and private 
volunteer networks in the greater Hartford area. By assessing the social networks within these 
resettlement models, I will assess refugees’ how refugees’ are acculturating within their 
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communities. Furthermore, I will address how these models affect and reinforce refugees’ 
disparate opportunities for integration.        
Methodological Overview 
 To assess the relationship different resettlement models and refugee economic, linguistic 
and social outcomes, I conducted a total of twenty-three interviews with case-managers, 
employees, volunteers and Syrian refugees in the Greater Hartford area. These interviews were 
semi-structured and averaged one hour and twelve minutes in length. I chose to focus on Syrian 
refugees for two main reasons: (1) their first-wave immigration status and, (2) their past and 
current political status in Connecticut, and the United States. First-wave immigration refers to 
migrants who arrive in a new country with a little or no members of their country of origin 
preceding them. This is important for my research question which addresses how the co-
sponsorship model bridges refugee social capital and, supposedly, better integration outcomes.  
In 2016 and early 2017, Syrian refugees arrived in large numbers to the United States due 
to humanitarian and political factors (See Page 27: “Timeline of Syrian Refugee Crisis”). During 
this time period, the Obama Administration attempted to prioritize Syrian refugees early in 
Obama’s second term, as it became clear that Assad’s regime was attacking civilians (Lind 
2018). But because of concerns about carefully vetting refugees to ensure that no terrorist group 
members snuck into the US, it took until the last couple of years of Obama’s presidency for 
Syrian refugee admissions to the US to increase (Lind 2018). After the 2016 Paris Attacks by 
ISIS militants, dozens of US governors, including Indiana Republican Mike Pence, ordered state 
agencies to halt resettlement activities (Hackel 2016). In response, Connecticut’s governor, 
Democrat Dannel Malloy stepped up to counter his colleagues by committing to accept Indiana’s 
diverted refugee population (Hackel 2016). Indeed, Connecticut played a crucial role in 
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maintaining the Obama Administration’s state capacity in accepting and resettling Syrian 
refugees.  
Upon arrival, Syrians had few pre-existing ethnic connections and had to forge new 
relationships with Americans and their fellow refugees during their resettlement. Politically, 
Syrian refugees have endured differing security clearances, travel policies and legal criteria to 
enter the United States. Specifically, President Trump’s travel bans and executive orders have 
currently disallowed affected Syrians (among some other Muslim refugees) to resettle in the 
United States. Given these policies, I was interested in assessing how this particular refugee 
group is faring two to three years after their arrival.  In total, I conducted interviews, in Arabic, 
with seven Syrian families in the Greater Hartford Area. Heba Karkar, a high-school aged Syrian 
refugee, assisted me with the translation and interpretation of the refugee interviews. Heba also 
provided me with interview connections and helpful advice in constructing my interview guide.  
 Greater Hartford provides a unique opportunity to analyze how three different 
resettlement models influence refugee outcomes. Two main refugee resettlement volags operate 
in Hartford, using a case management and co-sponsorship approach, respectively. Additionally, 
since 2017, volunteers from the Hartford suburbs have also initiated informal, but highly active, 
private sponsorships, allowing me to investigate how this novel approach to resettlement 
influences outcomes. Furthermore, Hartford Area mosques, partially affiliated with Catholic 
Charities, have been largely involved with private volunteering with newly-arrived Syrian 
refugees. Nonetheless, the majority of my interviews centered around individuals associated with 
Catholic Charities and Integrated Refugee and Immigration Services (IRIS). Catholic Charities is 
the largest resettlement agency in the Greater Hartford area and adheres to a traditional case-
management approach in resettling refugees. In other words, a case-manager is assigned to each 
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refugee family case and assists them in their first ninety days of resettlement. While Catholic 
Charities has a five-year contract with families, it is particularly involved in the family’s first few 
months in the United States. IRIS also resettles refugees with special immigration visas (SIVs) in 
this way, but they have also popularized their co-sponsorship model in the state of Connecticut. 
Specifically, IRIS partners with mostly faith-based congregations to resettle its refugees. 
Therefore, many case-management tasks are delegated to volunteers.  
Lastly, three out of the twenty-two interviews also focused on theses private volunteers 
who assisted Catholic Charities refugee families. These three volunteers, and their respective 
private-sponsorship partnerships were not affiliated with either Catholic Charities or IRIS, but 
provided extensive services in an unofficial volunteer capacity.  By comparing Catholic 
Charities, IRIS, and private sponsorship networks, I will assess the opinions, approaches and 
responsibilities of case-workers, employees, volunteers, with an eye to making policy 
recommendations for more effective refugee resettlement process. Tables 0.1 describes the 
employees, refugees, and volunteers associated with each model.  
 Before proceeding to the analysis, it is worth mentioning several factors that limit my 
ability to draw generalizations from Hartford’s experience to understanding refugee resettlement 
more broadly. First, Hartford area co-sponsorship groups may receive “easier” refugee families 
because IRIS case-managers and professionals handle high-need cases. “Easier” may refer to 
families who do not have severe medical issues or disabilities, extreme trauma or illiteracy in the 
Arabic language, or other major resettlement complications. Indeed, there may be some 
selection-bias in the co-sponsorship families interviewed compared to Catholic Charities 
families. Regardless of need-level, Catholic Charities’ caseworkers resettle and manage all the 
cases they receive making this pool’s experiences more diverse. Therefore, the outcomes I assess 
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in my methodology may be particular to Hartford area’s volags case selection practices. Second, 
Miriam (pseudonym), a local advocate for refugee rights, plays a varying role in all of the 
families I interviewed. Miriam has dedicated her life to assisting refugees’ in their resettlement, 
and her informal volunteer network, Refugee Advocacy Services (RAS), is involved with more 
than 86 refugee families in Connecticut. Miriam’s expertise, goals and overarching impact in the 
Greater Hartford Area refugee resettlement is not externally valid to all co-sponsorship, case-
management nor private volunteer networks in the United States.  Despite these caveats, the 
variation found in Hartford between case-management, co-sponsorship, and private sponsorship 
innovation, makes examination of this worthwhile and potentially revealing about how different 
resettlement approaches shape refugees’ varying outcomes.  
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Table 0.1: Twenty-three interviews conducted across three models of refugee resettlement  
Case-Management Model 
(Catholic Charities) 
Co-Sponsorship 
(IRIS) 
Private Sponsorship  
(WHOKE and Forward CT) 
Case-Managers 
Catholic Charities Case-Manager 1(Current)* 
Catholic Charities Case-Manager 2 (Current) 
Catholic Charities Case Manager 3 (Current) 
Catholic Charities Case Manager 4 (Former) 
Catholic Charities Case Manager 5 (Former) 
Case-Managers and Employees 
IRIS Case-Manager 1* 
IRIS Employee/Case-Manager 2 
IRIS Employee/Case-Manager 3 
 
Refugee Families 
Catholic Charities Refugee Family 1 
(Forward CT) 
 
Catholic Charities Refugee Family 2 
(WHOKE) 
 
Refugee Families (No private sponsorship) 
Catholic Charities Refugee Family 1 
Catholic Charities Refugee Family 2 
Total Interviews: 7 
Refugee Families 
IRIS Refugee Family 1 
Saint James/John Group**  
 
IRIS Refugee Family 2 
Beth Al Temple/Westminster 
Presbyterian 
 
IRIS Refugee Family 3 
Manchester Unitarian Universalist  
Private  
WHOKE Volunteer 1 
Forward CT Volunteer 1 
Berlin-Avon Mosque Association 
(BAMA) Volunteer 1 
Total Interviews: 5 
Volunteers 
Co-Sponsorship Volunteer 1 
(Private Volunteer) *** 
Saint James/John Group 
Co-Sponsorship Volunteer 2 
(Private Volunteer) 
Saint James/John Group 
 
Co-Sponsorship Volunteer 3 
(Private Volunteer) 
Saint James/John Group 
 
Co-Sponsorship Volunteer 4 
(No private volunteering) 
Beth Al Temple/Westminster  
Presbyterian 
 
Co-Sponsorship Volunteer 5 
(No private volunteering) 
Manchester Unitarian Universalist 
 
Total Interviews: 11 
 
*I have demarcated current and former Catholic Charities caseworkers. 
**This is the co-sponsorship congregation each refugee family and volunteer is part of.  
*** Some IRIS co-sponsorship volunteers were involved in private volunteering outside their respective family.  
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Outline of Thesis By Chapter  
To test how different models of refugee resettlement affect refugee integration outcomes, 
I conduct two types of analysis. In chapter 1, I trace the history of refugee resettlement in 
Connecticut to see how state officials, resettlement agencies and volunteers are involved in 
facilitating refugee integration. For this analysis, I analyze demographic data in the Hartford 
area, journalistic sources, and Hartford area grant/commission reports. I find that Catholic 
Charities, the Hartford area’s main case-management agency, has received criticism for it’s 
refugee involvement. Meanwhile, IRIS, the Hartford area’s co-sponsorship agency, has been 
praised for its innovative resettlement model.  Nonetheless, I begin to find that the relocation of 
refugees by means of private sponsorship contributes to municipal inequities between Hartford 
and West Hartford.  
Second, I conduct a case study of all three models of refugee resettlement (case-
management, community and private sponsorship) in the Hartford Area. The information for this 
case-study is generated from the twenty-three interviews I conducted with case-managers, 
volunteers, and Syrian refugees (see above). In Chapter 2, I discuss how Catholic Charities 
(case-management model) and IRIS (co-sponsorship model) institutionally function in resettling 
refugees. In other words, I examine the role of the agencies’ case-managers and employees in 
overseeing their resettlement operations. It is important to note that I do not address the private-
sponsorship model in this section because the volunteers work independently with no formal or 
agency oversight. I find that Catholic Charities and IRIS’s approaches to refugee resettlement are 
vastly different, and that Catholic Charities is disregarding federal regulations concerning 
refugee housing. In Chapter 3, I discuss my interview findings in relation to volunteers 
associated with community and private sponsorship models. I find that volunteers’ involvement 
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with refugee families vastly differs from participating in one co-sponsorship group to re-locating 
more than twenty Catholic Charities families to West Hartford. I also find that many co-
sponsorship group volunteers assisted private sponsorship networks in becoming involved with 
specific refugee families. In Chapter 4, I interview the Syrian refugee families who have been 
involved in all three models of resettlement. I find that families resettled by Catholic Charities 
faced various challenges within their first months in the United States. Furthermore, Catholic 
Charities families who received additional private sponsorship assistance obtained better 
economic, linguistic and social integration outcomes than those who did not. Comparatively, 
IRIS families emphasized and praised the intense assistance they received upon arrival. Overall, 
the findings suggest that the IRIS families were better equipped with employment, tutoring, 
transportation, and housing resources than their Catholic Charities counterparts. This information 
will be explained further in depth in Chapter 4, along with several tables illustrating the 
relationship between social connection and families’ integration outcomes.  
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CHAPTER 1: REFUGEE RESETTLEMENT IN THE HARTFORD AREA 
“I was proud that they’d come to the United States and Connecticut.” 
- Dannel P. Malloy, former government of Connecticut, November 19, 2015 
 
In November 2015, then Connecticut Governor, Dannel Malloy announced that 
Connecticut would accept a Syrian family who was rejected from resettling in Indiana. This 
family, a married couple and their 5-year old son, had waited three years to resettle in the United 
States from Jordan. They were scheduled to arrive in Indianapolis, but where diverted when 
Pence ordered state agencies to halt resettlement activities after the deadly attacks in Paris. 
Malloy’s statements reflected Connecticut’s welcoming response to Syrian refugees unable to 
resettle in other parts of the United States. In fact, in 2016 Connecticut accepted more than eight-
hundred refugees, which equates to 22 refugees per 100,000 residents. This is significantly 
greater than Connecticut’s average refugee per capita of 12 refugees per 100,000 citizens, from 
2010 to 2019. By analyzing Connecticut’s history of resettlement, we can better understand the 
current role of its current resettlement policies, stakeholders, and volag organizations. In turn, 
these factors will allow us to assess how Connecticut’s different resettlement models shape 
refugee integration outcomes.  
The chapter, therefore, will begin with an examination of Connecticut’s refugee 
coordinators and officials, grant-matching system and refugee integration policy and initiatives. 
This analysis will allow for the identification of Connecticut’s overall statewide effectiveness in 
refugee resettlement. Next, I will address the history and influence of Integration Refugee and 
Immigration Services (IRIS) and Hartford Catholic Charities (HCC) on refugee resettlement and 
integration outcomes. Finally, this historical, as well as organizational resettlement information, 
will be incorporated into a demographic analysis of the three municipalities that comprise my 
study: Hartford, West Hartford, and New Britain. The demographic analysis will address issues 
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of resource accessibility and resettlement initiatives within the racially and socioeconomically 
diverse municipalities of the Greater Hartford Area.  
Connecticut’s Refugee Resettlement, Officials and Policy 
 Since 2010, Connecticut has played a relatively minor role in refugee resettlement 
compared to other New England states (See Graph 1.1). Although Connecticut’s refugee arrivals 
are only second to Massachusetts, Connecticut has resettled the least amount of refugees on a per 
capita basis. Even Rhode Island, which is almost five times smaller than Connecticut, has 
resettled more refugees per 100,000 residents. Nationally, there is an average of 18 refugees per 
100,000 citizens, which is larger than Connecticut’s refugee-to-citizen ratio. The majority of 
Connecticut’s refugees arriving between FY 2010 and 2019 have been resettled in the cities of 
Hartford and New Haven. Cities such as Bridgeport, Derby and New Britain also play a 
substantial role, accepting a total of 645 refugee arrivals since FY 2010. According to a 2006 
report by the Brookings Institute, approximately 1.6 million refugees between 1983 and 2004 
have been resettled into large and medium-sized metropolitan areas (cities and suburbs) across 
the United States.1 In this study, medium-sized cities are defined as “metropolitan areas with less 
than one million population but more than 250,000 people.”2 While all of  Connecticut’s cities 
are smaller than 250,000 people, 88% of the refugees were resettled in urban cities with over 
100,000 residents .3  
 
 
                                                
1 Audrey Singer and Jill H. Wilson, “From ‘There’ to ‘Here’: Refugee Resettlement in Metropolitan America, 
The Brookings Institute, September 2006, https://www.brookings.edu/research/from-there-to-here-refugee-
resettlement-in-metropolitan-america/.  
2 Ibid, Audrey Singer and Jill H. Wilson.  
3 This data was collected from the Worldwide Refugee Processing Center (WRAPS) for Connecticut’s refugee 
arrivals for FY 2010 to 2018 (November 30, 2018). I organized refugee nationalities by destination or cities/towns 
and calculated municipalities arrivals over this time period.  
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Table 1.1: Refugees Resettled in New England States, Since 2010 
Source: Worldwide Refugee Admission Processing System (WRAPS) 
*Through March 31, 2019 
 
 
 
Source: Worldwide Refugee Admission Processing System (WRAPS) and Census Data (2010) 
*For 2019, the most up-to-date count on refugee arrivals is through March 31, 2019.  
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Graph 1.1: Average Refugee Arrivals Per Capita (100,000) 2010-2019*
State 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 
 
2019*  Total  
Connecticut 606 447 434 547 503 519 819 421 156 57 4,509 
Maine 303 197 203 360 361 425 607 274 62 75 2,867 
Massachusetts 1,931 1,548 1,541 1,830 1,797 1,688 1,734 1,037 464 198 13,768 
New Hampshire 303 517 363 379 322 446 515 306 162 110 3,423 
Rhode Island 243 157 130 171 163 185 337 191 86 48 1,711 
Vermont  299 361 350 322 308 312 386 229 133 84 2,784 
Total 3,685 3,227 3,021 3,609 3,454 3,575 4,398 2,458 1,063 572 29,062 
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For the past eight years, Connecticut’s largest refugee groups have been (in order) from Iraq, 
the Democratic Republic of the Congo, Syria, Burma, and Somalia.4 In 2016, with the U.S. 
increasing its refugee acceptances by about twenty percent, Connecticut resettled a record 
                                                
4 Refugee Processing Center (WRAPS Database). Interactive Reporting. “Arrivals by Destination and 
Nationality.” Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees, Migration. Office of Admissions- Refugee 
Processing Center: Refugee Arrivals Fiscal Year as of 30-November-2018. 
 Timeline of the Syrian Refugee Crisis 
 
Early 1500s-1918: Syrian was part of the Ottoman Empire for about 400 years.  
1918-1946: A period of French colonial rule which ended with Syrian independence.  
1963: The Ba’ath party took over the government, installing a socialist and secular regime. 
The new government persecuted dissenters, instituted land reform and nationalized banks.  
1970: The Minister of Defense, Hafez al-Assad, seized power and in 1971 declared himself 
president. He created a new legislature and rigged elections to maintain his power and the 
Ba’ath party. Assad belonged to the Alawite sector of Islam, and his policies favored 
members of this group. During the Assad regime, dissent was heavily suppressed.  
2000: After 30 years of rule, Hafez al-Assad died and his son Bashar al-Assad remains in 
power today. Under Al-Assad, authority under one person and one party (Ba’ath Party) 
continued. Political repression and government corruption did not end, however, and most 
Syrians continued to feel oppressed.  
2011: Uprising began as peaceful protests after the government arrested and allegedly tortured 
school children who wrote anti-government graffiti on a wall in Daraa. Perhaps inspired by 
Arab Spring movements in Egypt and Tunisia, Syrian protestors began calling for 
democratic reforms. In response to these demands, the Syrian government began arresting, 
beating, torturing and killing dissenters. By June 2011, an estimated 1,400 people had been 
killed and over 10,000 arrested by the Assad government.  
2013: Over 1,000 individual rebel brigades were fighting the Syrian government. 
Involvement by outside parties in rebel fighting, such as the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria 
[ISIS], have complicated Syria’s situation. Countries such as Iran, Russia, and the Lebanese 
Shi’a Muslim political/military group have supported the Syrian government.  
 
Since 2011, more than 400,000 people have been killed and millions driven from their homes. 
It is estimated that 6.5 million people, half of Syria’s population, are internally displaced 
within the country. In neighboring countries (i.e. Jordan, Lebanon, Egypt), 3 million Syrians 
are registered as refugees. In total, more than 5.6 million Syrians have fled the country as 
refugees. 
 
Sources: “Refugees from Syria.” CAL Cultural Orientation Resource Center. November 2014: 1-15.  
“Syria: Events of 2017.” Human Rights Watch. November 8, 2017. https://www.hrw.org/world-  
report/2018/country-chapters/syria# 
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number of 897 refugees. Of these 897 refugees, 367 arrived from Syria, indicative of the United 
States’ increased role in the Syrian refugee crisis (see “Timeline of the Syrian Refugee Crisis”).5  
In Connecticut, the Office of Community Services and Department of Social Services (DSS) 
is responsible for distributing federal funds related to the resettlement of refugees in 
Connecticut.6 DSS disburses Temporary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF), refugee cash 
assistance (RCA), medical assistance programs, reception and placement grants, and monitors 
resettlement activity throughout the state.7 DSS contracts with five resettlement agencies to 
provide case management, employment assistance, and other support services to resettled 
refugees, specifically.8  
1. Catholic Charities, Refugee and Immigration Services 
2. International Institute of CT, Inc 
3. Episcopal Social Services (dba) Integrated Refugee & Immigration Services (IRIS) 
4. Jewish Federation of CT, Inc 
5. Connecticut Coalition of Mutual Assistance Association, Inc.  
Connecticut is one of thirty-two states and the District of Colombia that administers RCA and 
related “self-sufficiency programs” such as employment services, ESL programming, case 
management and other refugee support though the state-administration model.9 In the State-
                                                
5 Refugee Processing Center (WRAPS Database). Interactive Reporting. “Arrivals by Destination and 
Nationality.” Department of State: Bureau of Population, Refugees, Migration. Office of Admissions- Refugee 
Processing Center: Refugee Arrivals Fiscal Year as of 30-November-2018. 
6 “Refugee Assistance Program.” Connecticut’s Official Website. 2018. https://portal.ct.gov/DSS/Economic-
Security/Refugee-Assistance-Program. 
7 Ibid, “Refugee Assistance Program.” https://portal.ct.gov/DSS/Economic-Security/Refugee-Assistance-
Program.  
8 Andrew Bolger, “Refugee Processing and Settlement,” Office of Legislative Research for Connecticut 
General Assembly, May 30, 2018, https://www.cga.ct.gov/olr/rptsbytopic.asp?olrYear=2018&olrTopic=ALL.  
9 Bethany Boland and Angela Gaffney, “Understanding the Intersection Between TANF and Refugee Cash 
Assistance Services: Findings from a Survey of State Refugee Coordinators,” Abt Associates, September 2017, 
https://www.abtassociates.com/insights/publications/report/how-do-states-assist-refugees-with-tanf-and-refugee-
cash-assistance, 4. 
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Administered Model, both TANF and RCA are always administered by state public assistance 
agencies.10 This program is unlike the Wilson-Fish Model in which TANF is typically 
administered by state agencies and RCA is administered through both resettlement or state 
agencies.11    
 In accordance to these resources, each state in the United States, except Wyoming, has a 
state refugee coordinator (SRC) who for oversees the design, implementation and coordination 
of refugee services.12 Federal law requires ORR to consult at least quarterly with the refugee 
state coordinator and health coordinator about the intended distribution and placement of 
refugees.13 Generally, the ORR requires the refugee state and health coordinators to; (1) ensure 
that refugees are not resettled in densely populated refugee areas; (2) provide mechanisms for 
resettlement agency representatives to meet at least quarterly with state and local government 
representation; and (3) account for the proportion of refugee and comparable entrants in the 
population in the area. Overall, however, the main role of SRC and their office is to promote 
coordination among resettlement agencies and streamline services statewide. Due to the number 
of agencies involved in the resettlement process, however, communication often presents 
hindrances to refugee integration.   
 In Connecticut, the state coordinator is Charles Anderson and the state refugee health 
coordinator is Allison Stratton. Surprisingly, the information of many states’ refugee 
coordinators, including Connecticut’s, are not readily available or transparent on state refugee 
                                                
10 Bethany Boland and Angela Gaffney, “Understanding the Intersection Between TANF and Refugee Cash 
Assistance Services: Findings from a Survey of State Refugee Coordinators,” Abt Associates, September 2017, 
https://www.abtassociates.com/insights/publications/report/how-do-states-assist-refugees-with-tanf-and-refugee-
cash-assistance, 5.  
11 Ibid, Bethany Boland and Angela Gaffney, 5.   
12 Ibid, Bethany Boland and Angela Gaffney, 5.  
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websites. However, the Office of Refugee Resettlement (ORR) provides a list and information 
for each state’s refugee coordinators. On the Connecticut State Website, information pertaining 
to Charles Anderson lies in contractual reports (2016-2019) with Catholic Charities and 
Episcopal Social Services. Essentially, these reports detail these resettlement agencies scope of 
services and responsibilities, contract performance, budget, reports, and program-specific and 
agency-specific sections. Other than these two reports, however, there is seldom information on 
Anderson’s duties or involvement in refugee resettlement. Allison Stratton’s position is 
somewhat more present on Connecticut’s website as a key figure in the state’s department of 
Public Health. Nonetheless, her position related to refugee health is not as apparent except for a 
2015 CLAS Standards slideshow outlining linguistically appropriate services for refugees and 
immigrants in Connecticut.14 By conducting internet searches, there is even less if any 
information about these two refugee officials. It appears publicly, at least, that refugee 
resettlement coordination may be lacking in Connecticut.  
 In the past, Connecticut has had difficulty managing relations between its refugee state 
coordinators and resettlement agencies in Hartford, the state’s largest refugee arrival destination. 
In 2005, an informal committee, the Hartford Refugee Resettlement Committee (HRRJC), was 
formed to address issues arising from the resettlement of refugees in Hartford, Connecticut.15 
Major stakeholders participating in the Committee included but were not limited to: Catholic 
Charities, Hartford Public Schools, the Department of Health and Human Services, the United 
                                                
14 Allison Stratton (DPH CLAS Standards Coordinator), “CLAS Standards 101, or An Introduction to the 
National Standards for Culturally and Linguistically Appropriate Services in Health and Health Care,” January 30, 
2015, https://portal.ct.gov/-/media/Departments-and Agencies/DPH/dph/hems/health_equity 
/CLAS101WEBBASEDBASIC20150130pdf.pdf?la=en.  
15 Gerald Brown and Mary Deiss Brown, “Refugee Resettlement in Hartford, Connecticut: Coordination of 
Services and Development of Resources,” This report is prepared through a grant from the Hartford Foundation for 
Public Giving received by the Hartford Refugee Resettlement Joint Commitment, December 8, 2008, 
http://www.hartfordinfo.org/issues/wsd/immigrants/refugee_resettlement_in_Htfd.pdf, 2.  
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Liberian Association and the Somali and Somali-Bantu communities in Hartford.16 The report 
calls for a greater empowerment of the state refugee coordinator’s office through effectively 
staffing and restructuring the State Refugee Coordinator’s Office.17 At the time, Connecticut’s 
state refugee coordinator, David Frascarelli, dedicated only 60% of his time to refugee matters as 
a single person in the Office.18 In addition to increased staffing at the Coordinator’s Office, the 
Hartford Resettlement Joint Commitment criticized the inability of the Coordinator to conduct 
quarterly meetings with all interested agencies, public and private.19 Furthermore, the report adds 
that once the State Coordinator’s Office establishes inclusive meetings, agencies and providers 
should work together to become knowledgeable about existing programs and funding.20 With 
federal refugee resources now dwindling, reassessment of the state collaboration between 
Hartford’s largest resettlement agencies, Hartford Catholic Charities (HCC) and Integrated 
Refugee and Immigration Service (IRIS) is necessary. By tracing the organizational history of 
HCC and IRIS, we can further evaluate the effectiveness of models of refugee resettlement in the 
Greater Hartford area.  
Hartford Catholic Charities and Integrated Refugee and Integration Services  
 Hartford Catholic Charities (HCC) was founded as a family and children’s human 
services agency under the Archdiocese of Hartford in 1920.21 HCC is an affiliate of Catholic 
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Charities USA, which was founded in 1910 at the Catholic University of America to assist the 
poor.22 Today, HCC provides a number of social services related to adoption, behavioral health, 
early childhood education, ESL classes, family violence education, Hispanic elderly services and 
pregnancy counseling.23Also, as a local affiliate of the national United States Conference of 
Catholic Bishops/Migration and Refugee Services (USBCC), HCC assists in refugee 
resettlement. HCC states on its website that it offers, “Linguistically and culturally appropriate 
comprehensive resettlement services designed to facilitate the refugee/asylee acculturation in the 
United States.” Indeed, HCC has resettled over 6,000 refugees in the Hartford area since its 
inception in 1975.24 Utilizing a case-management model of refugee resettlement, HCC provides 
social caseworkers to each refugee family or individuals to provide assistance in their 
acculturation. Catholic Charities refugees have been resettled from Somalia, Uganda, Burma, 
Iraq, Russia, Tunisia, Sudan, Cuba, Syria, Nepal and Afghanistan. For a long time, HCC had the 
largest refugee resettlement office in the state, comprised of a staff of twenty professional, who 
are fluent in 27 different languages.25 In FY 2017, HCC resettled 84 refugees in the Hartford and 
“provided continued support to hundreds of other refugees resettled in prior years.”26 
Furthermore, HCC has offered employment skill development and supportive services to 
refugees seeking jobs and professional work. HCC’s Migration, Refugee and Immigration 
Services Employment department reports an employment rate of 75% within the first four 
months of a refugee’s arrival.  
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 HCC’s CEO is Marek Kukula who oversees the agency’s operations and involvement in 
the Greater Hartford area. At HCC, there has been considerable CEO turnover for the last fifteen 
years: Rosa Alma Senatore (2003-2011), Lois Nesci (2011-2015) and the current CEO, Marek 
Kukula (2015 to present).  HCC also has a number of senior leaders in charge of its programs 
including Paula Mann-Agnew, the current Director of Migration, Refugee and Immigration 
Services.27 Despite available administrative information on the HCC website, there is seldom 
news publicity or media coverage of HCC’s role of refugee resettlement in the greater Hartford 
area. Searching for both Kukula and Mann-Agnew online, there is a very limited media presence 
of both individuals. In a few Hartford Courant articles, Mann-Agnew is mentioned as a director 
of HCC, but as a whole there are very few recent news articles addressing HCC’s refugee 
operations.  
While the media’s coverage of HCC’s was limited, there were several articles discussing 
the weakness of HCC’s refugee resettlement program from 2004-2006. The first article 
published by the New York Times discusses the traumatic resettlement of Somali-Bantu and 
Liberian refugees in Hartford. Sister Dorothy Strelchun, a HCC caseworker, describes how 
resettling these refugee groups is more complicated than any groups in past decade.28 One 2006 
article titled, “Refugees Protest Their Resettlement,” published by the Hartford Courant 
discusses the shortcomings of HCC.29 The Ahmed family, refugees from Somalia who arrived in 
Hartford in 2004, stated that, “they received little help from Catholic Charities- the agency that is 
charged with helping refugees resettle here.” In May 2006, the refugees gathered in front of the 
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Catholic Charities office on Asylum Avenue in Hartford along with organizers from Hartford 
Rally Together (HART), to protest the refugees’ treatment.30 Refugees from Somalia, Liberia 
and Bosnia and elsewhere complained that they had been forced to live in vermin and rat-
infested apartments, have received little or no job training, and have waited as long as eight 
months to be enrolled in school.31 In a separate article published by the Hartford News (reprinted 
by the Hartford Public Library), it states that in 2006 refugees and HART leaders demanded that 
Catholic Charities improve services for refugees and show how it allocates the funding it 
receives for refugee resettlement.32 
 Surprisingly, HCC’s public response to these 2006 refugee protests was quite limited. 
Reverend John P. Gatzak, spokesman for the Archdiocese of Hartford published a press release 
defending the program and stated: “The job of resettlement is a difficult one for the refugees and 
those who are assisting them.” The executive director of HCC at the time, Rosa Alma Senatore, 
did not respond formally to this public outcry. From these protests, the Hartford Refugee 
Resettlement Committee (HRRJC) emerged to address issues arising from the resettlement of 
refugees in Hartford by HCC.  While HCC expressed its concern about continuing 
responsibilities for refugees resettled after four months in this memo, HRRJC responded: 
“Catholic Charities should be urged to view referrals to the Refugee Assistance Center not as a 
termination of its services and as an abdication of its role as the resettlement agency, but rather 
as a supplement to their on-going in-house services.”33  In other words, according to the report 
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by HRRJC, HCC should be responsible for continued support of its refugees after its contractual 
three to four months of federal services. Indeed, this criticism of casework resettlement has 
drawn Connecticut’s attention to more innovative approaches to refugee resettlement.  
 In contrast to HCC, Integrated Refugee and Integration Service (IRIS) is a co-
sponsorship resettlement organization which receives assistance from a mix of professionals and 
community volunteers. In total, IRIS has welcomed more than 5,000 refugees to Connecticut 
since 1982.34 In 1982, the Episcopal Diocese of Connecticut (now the Episcopal Church in 
Connecticut) created the Diocesan Refugee Services Committee (DRSC).35 Initially, the DRSC 
was interested in exploring whether Connecticut parishes would be interested in welcoming and 
resettling Southeast refugee families after the Vietnam conflict.36 The Diocesan Refugee 
Committee became the Interfaith Refugee Ministry (IRM) in 1990, and moved its headquarters 
to its present location in New Haven in 1995.37 About twelve years later, the Interfaith Refugee 
Ministry formally became IRIS-Integrated Refugee & Immigrant Services.38 In 2014, after 30 
years as a program of the Episcopal Church in Connecticut, IRIS became an independent 
resettlement organization.39 IRIS’s innovative approach to refugee resettlement moves 
community volunteers into the social services sector.  In theory, the aim of this model is to 
provide continued support for its refugees until self-sufficiency is fully achieved, which often 
continues outside a four-month case-management timeline. Indeed, IRIS takes advantage of the 
United States’ long-standing faith-based resettlement model, in which congregations assist 
families.  
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 To sponsor a refugee family through IRIS, individuals must create a core group of at least 
three members who must complete the IRIS co-sponsorship training.40 In total, the resettlement 
team must have at least 10 organized members (with clearly defined roles and responsibilities) 
who must be able to volunteer a total of 40 hours a week (e.g. 4 hours/person).41 For the most 
part, religious congregations become involved in co-sponsorship given their available volunteers 
and pooled resources. It is required that the resettlement team must raise $4,000-$7,000 for up to 
the 6 months of rental assistance and other initial resettlement costs and provide documentation 
of adequate funds.42 In addition to funding, the resettlement team must prove they can secure 
housing in two weeks notice, prepare a fully-furnished apartment and advise refugees on local 
rental markets, DSS, ESOL, health care, and employment opportunities.43 Once a group has 
fulfilled all of these responsibilities, it receives a “green light” from IRIS. In 2016, IRIS received 
about several arrival notices per month; therefore, it usually did not take more than two months 
to match groups with families.44 In 2018, with limited refugee arrivals, however, it can take 
many months to match a refugee with a co-sponsorship group. Nonetheless, once an arrival 
notice for a family arrives, IRIS shares the case information (names, ages, gender, language, 
education, nationality, religion, health issues and employment background) with the groups and 
asks for two days for the group to give a confirmation of co-sponsorship.45 
In the first month of resettlement, the family must go to IRIS’s headquarters in New 
Haven nine times for IRIS cultural orientation and resettlement education (CORE) and refugee 
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health assessments (RHAs).46 Once the family has received cultural orientation and health 
assessments, IRIS immediately provides linguistic programming and job training. The 
employment and education services director, Will Kneerim states, “The Mantra of the program is 
self-sufficiency- helping families find jobs is all-important.”47 According to Kneerim, 70 percent 
of the refugees find jobs within four months and 90 percent find jobs in six months. 48 Often, 
highly educated refugees with little English speaking skills find themselves working in factories, 
restaurant kitchens or other low wage jobs. To assist refugees in language acquisition, IRIS 
provides free English classes for adults every weekday morning and offers information about 
other ESL programming throughout the state.49 Staff and volunteers also make sure older 
children are enrolled in school and provide an after-school tutoring program.50 
 IRIS’s Executive Director is Christopher George, who has spent most of his professional 
life living in and working on the Middle East. Before returning to Connecticut in 2004, he had 
worked seven years in the West Bank and the Gaza strip.51 Unlike, HCC’s CEO, Chris George 
has a considerable internet and social media presence. After searching “Chris George IRIS,” I 
found that George and the organization have about seven full pages of news articles, photos and 
social media links (i.e LinkedIn and Twitter). News coverage ranged from local Hartford 
Courant and Connecticut Mirror articles to NPR Weekend Edition podcasts and even an Atlantic 
op-ed. In addition to IRIS’ local and national publicity, the organization’s website contains 
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detailed biographies and information for each of its employees. Compared to the HCC, IRIS’ 
resettlement operations are much more transparent due to its community-based model.   
 IRIS’s model has received national attention from a number of policy interest groups. 
Matthew La Corte, an immigration policy analyst at the Niskanen Center, a libertarian think-tank 
in Washington, relates IRIS to a Reagan-era model that lasted from 1987 to 1993. Reagan’s 
model was a federal initiative in which private, sponsoring organizations agreed to provide more 
basic needs until a refugee became self-sufficient.52 Anne Richard, Assistant Secretary of the 
PRM department from 2011-2017 stated in 2016, “We are open to a pilot program [similar to 
IRIS]. We don’t have enough time in the Obama administration to design and introduce a private 
sponsorship program in the U.S., but it could be done in this [2017] fiscal year.” Unfortunately, 
Donald Trump has expressed no interest in this policy model and continues to dismantle United 
States refugee operations.  
 Along with policy officials, refugees and community-members have praised IRIS’ 
mission and initiatives in the Greater Hartford Area. Hewad Jhan Hewat, an Afghani refugee, 
persecuted by Taliban terrorist groups, arrived Connecticut in 2008.53 At a Yale-IRIS refugee 
workshop this fall, Hewat mentioned that it was difficult to adjust to life in the United States, but 
that he was thankful and grateful for IRIS’ support.54 Specifically, he states: “IRIS is like my 
family. I miss my father and my mother. But when I feel like I have to visit them, I see members 
of IRIS, and I feel like I saw my father, my grandmother, or my mother.” 55 
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Jhan Hewat is one of many refugees IRIS has resettled and assisted over the last decade. Ms. 
Dunn, a panelist at a Newtown IRIS event and a member of IPRR, a community faith-based 
organization which works with IRIS recalls that assisting refugees with their resettlement has 
been the “highlight of her life.” Having helped two refugee families from the Congo, Ms. Dunn 
is fascinated by the courage and entrepreneurial spirit of refugees.56 Indeed, IRIS has become 
quite popular with more than fifty groups around Connecticut- churches, mosques, synagogues 
and even a book group- have asked to partner with IRIS in resettling refugees in their own 
communities. 
Racial relations and resettlement in Hartford and its surrounding municipalities   
Between HCC and IRIS, more than 4,000 refugees have been resettled in Connecticut 
over the last 10 years.57 More than a third of these refugees, have been resettled by Catholic 
Charities within the city of Hartford.58 Co-sponsorship and private sponsorship refugees have 
been settled in or relocated to surrounding suburbs, particularly West Hartford and the nearby 
city of New Britain. In addition to the role of differing resettlement models in shaping refugee 
outcomes, refugees’ town of settlement plays an important role in integration outcomes. 
Moreover, these two factors are linked. Prospects for socioeconomic mobility differ across 
towns, and co-sponsorship and private-sponsorship refugees are more likely to reside in towns 
with more opportunities.  
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Table 1.2 Demographic Composition of New Britain, Hartford, and West Hartford  
  New Britain Hartford West Hartford  
White 34,919 19,765 47,307 
Hispanic 26,934 54,185 6,192 
Black or African-American 7,982 44,223 3,624 
American Indian and Alaska Native 99 309 58 
Asian 1,672 3,347 4,623 
Native Hawaiian/Other Pacific Islander 16 27 15 
Other  1,584 2,919 1,449 
Total Population  73,206 124,775 63,268 
Source: Census Data (2010) 
These three municipalities (Hartford, West Hartford, and New Britain) compose the 
metropolitan region of Greater Hartford which also includes municipalities such as Bloomfield, 
Avon, Farmington, Simsbury, Bristol, Manchester, and East Hartford. While these towns and 
cities comprise “Greater Hartford,” there are major racial, socio-economic and educational 
differences within these communities. For one, the city of Hartford is 81% non-white, minority, 
whereas West Hartford is almost 74% non-Hispanic white (see Table 1.2). In Hartford, the 
median household income from 2016 was $36,005 and its overall poverty rate was 32%-  about 
2.5 times greater than the national average (12.3%).59 Furthermore, New Britain’s racial 
population is about half minority, and the poverty rate was 22%- 10 percentage points greater 
than the national average.60 In West Hartford, the 2016 poverty rate was only 8% with a median 
household income of $91,875.61 Furthermore, West Hartford’s population was about 75% white. 
Indeed, these three municipalities are reflective of Connecticut’s striking racial and 
socioeconomic disparities. For instance, the average household income of Connecticut’s richest 1 
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percent is nearly 43 times what the bottom 99 percent earns.62 Only the state of New York has a 
greater income inequality ratio, and in no other state does the top 1 percent’s earnings match 
those of Connecticut’s richest households in communities such as West Hartford, Avon and 
Greenwich.63  
The racial and socioeconomic disparities between Hartford and its surrounding 
municipalities leads to differences in housing, employment, transportation and education 
accessibility. For instance,  in 1996, the landmark Sheff v.O’Neill decision found that racial 
isolation in Hartford public schools violated children’s constitutional rights to an equal 
education.64 While this case aimed to improve the distribution of education resources, in 
Connecticut, today, the state still places two-thirds of its black and Hispanic public school 
students in segregated and low-income institutions.65 Furthermore, Connecticut’s state 
achievement gap between low-income and middle-class/wealthy students is the largest in the 
United States.66 In standardized tests developed by the Smarter Balanced Assessment 
Consortium, more than 80 percent of Connecticut’s richest towns surpassed the minimum 
standards for English in the 2014-15 school year.67 Meanwhile, seventy percent of the poor 
towns failed to meet these standards.68 With the majority of ESL and special education students 
in Hartford’s public schools, not its magnet institutions, educational resources are stretched for 
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these curricula.69 For newly-arriving refugee students, ESL classes and programming are 
essential to social and economic mobility. Refugees resettled in Hartford and attending its 
neighborhood schools, therefore, may have limited accessibility to linguistic opportunities. This 
is just one example of how municipal resources or lack thereof, can contribute to diverse refugee 
integration outcomes and resettlement experiences in the Greater Hartford area.  
Small, post-industrial cities, such as Hartford, are where many refugees have their 
experiences with American culture, lifestyle and U.S. institutions. Similar to some immigrants, 
refugees are forced out of their home country and must live in often dangerous transitory camps 
and cities. Many refugees also deal with profound trauma and uncertainty in their international 
resettlement. These experiences shape refugee perceptions of their initial U.S. resettlement 
placements and sometimes American society, as a whole. In her 2013 ethnographic study, Janet 
Bauer, a scholar of Muslim migration, describes refugee interactions within Hartford’s 
multiracial landscape. Bauer’s research focuses on a large group of refugees (i.e. Kurds, Somali-
Bantu, Kosovar-Albanians, Cubans) to map diverse cultural spaces in the Hartford metro area.70 
She explains, “Estimated to be about 4% of the state’s residents, and increasingly from Muslim 
countries, refugees are not the largest groups of newcomers.”71 To an extent, Connecticut’s small 
population of refugees tends to “blend in” within urban municipalities composed of  large 
foreign-born populations and minority residents. This is certainly true with Hartford, which has 
become increasingly a majority-minority city with predominately white contiguous suburbs and 
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black and Latino neighborhoods in the center.72 Consequently, Bauer finds that refugee 
newcomers often culturally assimilate into the landscape paved by their Latino neighbors, co-
workers and classmates in Hartford. Interviewing Muslim refugees and Hispanic residents in 
their place of work, researchers discovered a transnational interest in telenovelas, Spanish 
language-television dramas.73 In addition, at Bulkeley High School in Hartford, Bauer found that 
Bosnian teenagers absorbed American culture largely through the language and hip-hop styles of 
their Hispanic classmates.74 Along Park Street and New Britain Avenue, Cubans, Kosovars, 
Albanians and Somalis have integrated their  businesses as hairdressers, tax preparers, 
restaurateurs, ethnic-based shop owners, and video store owners alongside their host-community 
minority counterparts.75 Many policy studies have shown that refugees highly contribute to their 
local communities by opening businesses and bringing new ideas, culture, cuisine, entertainment 
and much more.  In Hartford, this blend of ethnic and cultural identities has been important for 
sustaining and revitalizing refugee and minority communities. In majority-white towns such as 
West Hartford, refugees also provide human and cultural capital, but to what extent should this 
expertise be spread to already socioeconomically privileged communities?  
While Bauer’s ethnographic accounts showcase insightful interactions between refugees 
and Hartford community members, there is some difficulty in resettling refugees within its 
urban-metro area. For one, with Hartford’s increasing foreign-born population, there has been 
competition for  job opportunities within proximity of refugee housing.76 This has drawn 
Hartford refugees to minimum-wage factory and production jobs that have moved out of the city 
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to surrounding suburbs.77 With Hartford’s unreliable public transportation system, refugees have 
limited accessibility to distant low-skill leveled jobs. Recalling similar economic challenges, 
Mawar Al Ansari, who fled Syria with his family in 2012, describes how in Hartford, he did not 
have a job or a car.78In addition, his teenage children were struggling to learn English and 
assimilate into Hartford’s student body. Dealing with “constant banging” on their Rockwood 
Street apartment in Hartford, the Al-Ansari family relocated to neighboring suburbs with 
Miriam’s assistance. Interestingly, Bauer recounts how many refugees “learned” from their 
Latino/black co-workers to not “take the bus at night” or “walk around in certain areas of 
Hartford.”79  
While crime in Hartford is higher than surrounding suburbs, refugee perceptions of this 
racialized issue can be a mix of real, learned and imagined experiences. In addition to the Al 
Ansari’s, the Alassafs, another Hartford resettled Syrian refugee family, found a superior West 
Hartford apartment and resources through RAS.80 Miriam explains, “the reality is that some 
resettlement organizations, which help bring refugee families to America, are only able to 
provide a few months of support for a family to get on their feet.”81 Paula Mann-Agnew a 
director of social programs at Hartford Catholic Charities (HCC), which resettles the majority of 
its refugees in Hartford, defends its case-management model: “When we are able to set them up, 
we’re settling them up in a way that they can be self-sufficient and pay their rent, they have 
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enough money to do what they need to do, they don’t end up homeless…it is never going to be 
our intention to put them in a place they can’t afford.”82 
Indeed, Connecticut’s co-sponsorship agencies such as IRIS and some of its 
informal/private volunteer networks (i.e. RAS) have contributed to this residential segregation of 
resettlement. Because co-sponsorship groups are required to raise substantial money, upper-
middle class, suburbanites have been disproportionately involved in refugee resettlement. By 
placing refugees within their communities, suburban co-sponsorship groups can coordinate more 
effectively, yet perpetuate municipal inequality. Other private volunteer networks have 
purposefully relocated refugee families from Hartford to surrounding suburbs. Many of these 
“relocated families” receive ongoing support and connections made through RAS and 
ForwardCT, another private-sponsorship coalition, to make ends meet.83 In fact, nearly thirty 
volunteers have been involved with helping a single family meet a range of needs including: in-
home ESL tutoring, furniture donation and consistent transportation to ESL classes, grocery 
stores and job interviews.84  
To an extent, the “visibility” of refugee populations and community advocacy in 
majority-white suburbs has led to many people becoming directly involved in co-sponsorship. 
Nonetheless, it seems that refugee over-subsidization in suburban towns has reinforced 
Connecticut’s segregated municipalities and resources. Indeed, HCC’s less-immersive approach 
in Hartford seems to have been less impactful and more isolating for refugee newcomers. That 
being said, it is difficult to ignore the ways that refugees and minority populations have reshaped 
                                                
82 “From Syria with hope: Organizations helping refugee family with transition,” New Britain Herald, June 11, 
2017, http://www.newbritainherald.com/NBH-General+News/287845/from-syria-with-hope-organizations-helping-
refugee-family-with-transition 
83 Matthew Broderick, “Starting Over: Volunteers Help Syrian Refugee Family Find a New Home in West 
Hartford, The Hartford Courant, July 1, 2017, https://www.courant.com/hartford-magazine/hc-syrian-refugee-
family-west-hartford-20170701-story.html. 
84 Ibid, Matthew Broderick.  
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and invigorated Hartford’s cultural, political and economic landscape. The deeply structural 
factors which shape different models of resettlement, pose important questions regarding 
accessibility to municipal resources, integration outcomes, and community revitalization. In the 
next section, interviews assessing the role of case-management, community, and private 
sponsorship networks will provide a full picture of the complexities of refugee resettlement and 
integration in the Greater Hartford area.  
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CHAPTER 2: Catholic Charities and IRIS Case-Managers and Employees 
Catholic Charities Case-Managers 
When a Catholic Charities (CC) refugee family resettles in Connecticut, they receive 
expensive loans for plane tickets, collect their baggage at JFK, and meet their case-manager at 
the airport terminal. For the next three months, the case-manager’s human capital, cultural 
understanding, and social connections are crucially important for refugee self-sufficiency. This 
individual is expected to teach refugees’ the insides-and-outs of the American welfare system, 
the English language, and the intricacies of the job market- all within a ninety-day time period. 
Given this federal timeframe, the case-management model is highly reliant on the efficacy of a 
single case-manager in achieving these daunting tasks. The community and private sponsorship 
models, in comparison, operate under a longer, less-regulated time period, with several 
committed volunteers. In addition to their time, the volunteers provide refugees with connections 
to jobs, housing ESL classes, and educational opportunities, among other resources. While CC 
case-managers also assist refugees with these areas, their caseload, and contractually-obligated 
deadlines, and tasks, may compromise their ability to bridge social capital for refugee families.  
To assess Catholic Charities’ case-management model, I conducted three, one-hour long 
interviews with Catholic Charities (CC) case-managers. Among the CC case-managers, I 
interviewed three currently employed individuals, and two individuals who were former Catholic 
Charities employees. Indeed, Hartford Catholic Charities has undergone substantial restructuring 
and case-manager overhaul due to President Trump’s lowered refugee ceiling. During the 2016-
2017 period, a former CC case-manager explained to me, “There were 10 of us resettling about 
ten families a month, and now there are only three case-managers.” As of now, Catholic 
Charities is resettling no refugees, but is contractually obligated to assist its resettled refugees for 
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up to five years. By interviewing not only current, but former caseworkers, I can assess the 
organization’s refugee resettlement initiatives over the last five years. With the current case-
managers, I was unable to record or ask specific questions related to issues the organization had 
confronted. Candidly, I was told that I could only conduct the interview if I was not recording 
their conversation. The former case-managers, on the other hand, were much more open in terms 
of information and allowed me to record our conversation.  
Notably, the caseworkers were a diverse group, many refugees, who have dealt with the 
resettlement experience themselves. Out of the five caseworkers I interviewed, four were 
refugees or asylees who came through Catholic Charities. Furthermore, the one native-born case-
manager held previous professional roles at Catholic Charities. Case Manager 4, a refugee, 
explained, “We know how they feel. That’s why they [Catholic Charities] chose some case 
managers who are refugees, who went through the process.” Combined, the case managers speak 
over six different languages- Arabic, French, Jamaican-Patwa, Burmese, and several different 
Central African dialects. Strategically, it seems Catholic Charities has prioritized hiring case-
managers who can culturally and linguistically relate to their refugee clientele in Hartford. 
Furthermore, it seems that Catholic Charities’ largely hires internal refugee clientele and 
professionals as case-managers.   
Case Managers’ Roles and Approaches to Refugee Resettlement  
 When interviewing case managers about their roles and responsibilities, I received 
different responses from current and former employees. Interestingly, the current case-managers 
provided less anecdotal examples of their experiences and referred to their more technical duties 
during the first month of a refugees’ arrival. First, the case managers discussed how they are 
required to pick up their clients from the airport and bring them to an apartment with a 
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culturally-appropriate meal. The next day, the case managers go shopping with the refugees and 
bring them to Catholic Charities for an in-take meeting. At this meeting, case managers and their 
respective refugees discuss their respective rights, responsibilities and goals. After this meeting, 
case managers assist their refugees with school enrollment, medical assessments, ESL, social 
services, job placement, and other critical tasks. After the first month, however, case-managers 
explained how they are only required to conduct a single 30-day check-in with their refugee 
clientele to ensure proper transition. After three months elapses, case-managers are still 
contractually connected to their clientele, but they work with refugees less intensively. 
While current case-managers described this first-month resettlement in a structured 
manner, former case-managers provided a different image. Specifically, former case-managers 
described the lack of notification Catholic Charities receives for incoming refugees. Sometimes, 
case-managers were not notified of incoming refugees until the day of their arrival. 
Consequently, many of Catholic Charities’ refugee clients were temporarily placed into motels 
or hotels for several days before their housing was secured. When housing became available, 
Catholic Charities apartments were not fully-furnished, and refugees used their federal welcome 
money to purchase easily-donated items. Case Manager 4 explains, “Sometimes we have 
donations, so instead of taking their money to buy things, some of them are lucky.” Based on 
these accounts, Catholic Charities is violating federal standards which require volag case-
managers to take refugees to an apartment: 
“Which has basic furnishings, appliances, climate-appropriate clothing, and some of the 
food typical of the refugee’s culture.”85 
 
                                                
85 “Planning of Refugees’ Arrival in the United States.” U.S. Department of State: The Reception and Placement 
Program. https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/. 
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Furthermore, case-managers discussed refugees’ disappointment with their housing placements. 
Specifically, how Syrian refugees’ expectations of “big apartments or houses” fell short of what 
Catholic Charities offered.  For employment, case-managers explained how they initially placed 
refugees in jobs that paid for their family’s expenses. In many circumstances, these jobs did not 
match the refugees skillset or background, but their level of English proficiency. In turn, case-
managers described scenarios in which they had to “force” their refugees to attend ESL classes, 
in order to “better themselves” and assimilate. Indeed, former case-managers provided a chaotic 
and somewhat coercive description of their first-month experiences- a sharp contrast from 
current case-managers’ idealized version.   
Combined, however, both past and current Catholic Charities case-managers described 
their “tough-love” and hardened approach towards refugee self-sufficiency. In other words, case-
managers explained how they limited their assistance with refugees’ needs to prepare refugees 
for independence. Case-Manger 1 characterized this case-manager approach as “discharge from 
day one.” Instead of scheduling a medical appointment for refugees, for example, case-managers 
would make refugees call the doctor and find transportation to the office. To practice, case-
managers would “role-play” with the refugees about what to say on their phone calls. In this 
way, case-managers could provide refugees with practice and feedback concerning real-life” 
scenarios. In interviews with former case-workers, “discharge from day one” was characterized 
as a “basic needs approach” in which Catholic Charities provides refugees with basic needs (i.e. 
jobs, housing, social services), but refugees must “help themselves.” To an extent, this approach 
reflects case-managers concerns with “over-indulging” refugees to the point where they become 
dependent. That being said, refugees arrive in the United States with little to no information 
about American healthcare, government services, or laws. In addition, most case-management 
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agencies like Catholic Charities, legally provide refugees’ services for only three to six months. 
Therefore, there are already strict and clear timelines concerning case-manager detachment from 
their clientele. It seems that current case-manager’ approach of “Discharge from Day 1” led to 
her somewhat idealized perceptions of refugee integration in Hartford.  
Views on Refugee Integration 
  Similar to their description of refugees’ first-month, former and current case-managers 
opinions diverged regarding refugee integration. To begin, current case-workers spent 
considerable interview time discussing their clients’ “success stories.” For instance, they relayed 
how a lot of their refugee clients are now accountants, doctors and lawyers. For about fifteen 
minutes, one case-worker discussed how her former refugee client was attending the Julliard 
School of Music in New York. While these refugee accounts were meaningful, these CC case-
workers dodged difficult questions related to refugees’ current challenges in learning English, 
accessing resources or well-paying, benefited income. In general terms, however, current 
caseworkers addressed the importance of employment and housing in facilitating integration into 
American society. If refugees’ income and housing are stable, then their stress in the United 
States is reduced. Due to Connecticut’s high cost of living, therefore, case-managers explained 
how they often pair different refugee individuals together. These individuals do not arrive with 
families, but are what Catholic Charities calls “solo cases.” In addition to housing and income, 
Case-Manager 2 emphasized the importance of English education: “Without language refugees 
can’t function.” Case Manager 2 exemplified this point by describing how refugees must 
effectively communicate with doctors and receptionists to schedule their medical appointments. 
Furthermore, current case-managers described the difficulty of matching refugees’ background 
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to employment opportunities, without basic English-skills. While refugees are “former engineers 
or doctors,” these newcomers must “start from new” making integration difficult.  
 Compared to current case managers, former case-managers described refugee integration 
mainly in terms of psycho-social well-being instead of technical integration terms. Case-
Manager 4 emphasized that “welcoming people is very important” and a case-manager’s job 
requires the ability to do “more.” For instance, when case-managers pick up refugees from the 
airport, they must “cope” with and facilitate their emotional arrival. Case-Manager 4 describes 
that when picking up refugees from the airport some case-managers are “too professional” and 
unreceptive to refugees’ well-being. Dealing with post-traumatic stress from displacement, living 
refugee camps and travelling to the United States, refugees are in psychologically vulnerable 
position when they arrive. In addition to securing English speaking-skills, employment and 
housing, former case-managers emphasize how case managers should be there when refugees 
need emotional support. Indeed, the former caseworkers’ emphasis on refugee mental health 
contradicts Catholic Charities “basic needs” approach. As stated above, the ability for case 
managers to “do more” outside of what is legally obligated, is crucial for refugee integration. 
While refugees can live in an apartment, go to work, or bring their kids to school, their feelings 
of acceptance, social connection or inclusion within a society are also important indicators of 
integration. With Catholic Charities doing the bare minimum, or even less of what is federally 
required, refugee clients are set-back in their integration.   
Challenges Facing Catholic Charities  
 In the interviews conducted, two resettlement issues appeared most salient for case-
managers: (1) Donald Trump’s refugee ceiling and, (2) housing in the city of Hartford. In regard 
to the former, case-managers thoroughly discussed how lowered refugee admissions have 
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affected their operations. As of now, there are only three case-managers working at Catholic 
Charities who are assisting clients who they are obligated to through five-year USBC and ORR 
grants. Furthermore, Catholic Charities is receiving no clients for FY 2019. Certainly, this is a 
large difference from the 300 to 400 refugees Catholic Charities’ was handling in 2016. For 
instance, former Case Manager 4 describes how in 2016 and 2017, she had upwards of six to ten 
new refugee families a month. Despite Catholic Charities’ curtailed funding and lay-offs, current 
case managers explained how refugees are enduring the greatest impact, not the office. Current 
and former case managers alike emphasized the Trump Administration’s inhumanity and lack of 
empathy towards humanitarian crises. Due to Catholic Charities large staff turnover and lack of 
arrivals, the Refugee and Migration program has refocused its efforts on assisting asylees in 
Hartford. In this way, Catholic Charities can continue assisting their resettled refugees, but also 
support humanitarian issues in a tangible way.   
 While all of the Catholic Charities case managers discussed national refugee policy, 
former case managers emphasized housing as one of the organization’s largest challenges. 
Interestingly, current case-managers veered away from discussing Catholic Charities specific 
issues with refugee housing, a service area in which the organization has received substantial 
criticism. When I interviewed former case-workers, however, they detailed Catholic Charities’ 
hyper-reliance on exploitative landlords for refugee housing. In particular, Case Manager 4 
described how Hartford landlords would not perform maintenance within the apartments, but 
“come to collect the rent” at the end of the month. Specifically, when refugee complained of rats 
lack of heating, and water leaks, landlords would not address these issues. Consequently, 
refugees would complain to their case-managers, and case-managers would turn to supervisors, 
yet Catholic Charities seemed to remain complacent in the problem. In addition to lack of 
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maintenance, former case managers explained how refugees were placed in overcrowded 
apartments. In one scenario, a refugee family of six was placed into a small apartment with only 
two bed-rooms, in which the wife and daughters slept in the kitchen for extra space. 
Unbelievably, one former case-manager discussed this same two-bedroom scenario, but with a 
group of ten individual refugees. 
 While Catholic Charities’ may be trying to mitigate refugee rental expenses, this level of 
overcrowding is unlawful and dangerous. According to Connecticut law, landlords must provide 
refugee tenants a clean apartment with functional plumbing and heating services.86 In addition, 
Hartford local housing, health and fire codes stipulate that landlords must ensure that pest 
problems are dealt with, and the overcrowding of tenants does not occur.87 Based upon these 
accounts, Catholic Charities has ignored landlords legal responsibilities and state and local 
housing laws. Certainly, overcrowding and apartment cleanliness is not an issue specific to 
Catholic Charities refugees, but people living in urban poverty. Nonetheless, refugees are the 
contractual responsibility of Catholic Charities, which receives financial remuneration to ensure 
their resettlement. Using refugee welcome money, case managers knowingly make security 
deposits for poorly-managed and unsuitable apartments. In many scenarios, if refugees relocate 
to surrounding towns and cities in their first three months, their security deposits and limited 
federal funding are lost. In other words, the security deposits for case-managers’ unsuitable 
housing, for which refugees have no input, deprives refugees of their federally allotted welcome 
money.  
                                                
86 “Rights and Responsibilities of Landlords and Tenants in Connecticut,” State of Connecticut Judicial Branch 
Superior Court (Form JDP-HM-31Revised 8/2017). https://www.jud.ct.gov/Publications/hm031.pdf 
87 “Hartford Housing Code,” http://www.hartford.gov/dds-code/232-development-services/2292-enf-
housingcodeenf.  
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While affordable housing is an issue in Hartford, case managers must do a better job at 
assessing the up-keep of apartments and landlords’ intentions. Case Manager 4 explains how it is 
difficult for refugees to feel welcomed in the United States if they are placed into a “dirty 
apartment.” Indeed, the quality of housing is an important factor for refugee well-being and 
integration outcomes. Between current and former CC case-managers, the latter were more 
effective in relaying Catholic Charities’ resettlement operations. While current caseworkers 
provided me with technical details of their duties, they did not extensively address resettlement 
issues (i.e. housing) for which Catholic Charities has received criticism from refugees, 
community-members and local advocates. Conversely, former case managers provided me with 
the anecdotal information missing from current employees’ accounts. Overall, the case-
managers’ description of Catholic Charities’ resettlement model emphasized the lack of 
coordination, oversight and legally-required assistance that refugees are supposed to receive 
within their first 90 days.  
IRIS Case-Managers and Employees 
 Co-sponsorship, unlike Catholic Charities’ case-management model, provides refugees 
with many volunteers for whom to receive assistance. Furthermore, volunteers’ combined time 
commitment and resources allow IRIS case-managers and professionals’ to be less directly 
involved with their co-sponsored clients. Institutionally, therefore, IRIS functions quite 
differently than its Catholic Charities counterpart. While IRIS volunteers have less training than 
professional IRIS case-managers, their commitment and volunteering purposes provide refugees 
with increased resources, social connections and attention- all challenges of the case-
management model. The interconnectedness of the co-sponsorship group, in consequence, 
provides refugees with employment, ESL, and social opportunities, unavailable via the case-
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management model. Compared to solely having one case-manger, a co-sponsorship group 
provide multiple points of advocacy and service.  
To assess IRIS institutional framework, I interviewed three current employees at 
Integration Refugee and Immigrant Services (IRIS). The employees included one Reception and 
Placement (R & P) caseworker, and two directors of case-management and co-sponsorship.  In 
comparison to the Catholic Charities case-managers, the IRIS employees’ professional roles 
were much more compartmentalized. In other words, IRIS had employees who specifically 
assisted with different areas of refugee resettlement such as housing, energy assistance, job 
placement and social service support. Furthermore, case-management oversight of co-sponsored 
refugees was less involved compared to IRIS’s R & P refugees who were mainly Afghanis or 
Iraqis with Special Immigrant Visas (SIVs) along with “special refugee cases.” Indeed, IRIS’ 
resettlement of SIV refugees more closely resembled Catholic Charities’ case-management 
procedure for all its refugees. 
 Similar to Catholic Charities, most of IRIS’ SIV refugees were resettled in New Haven 
within close proximity to IRIS’ headquarters. In addition, the case-manager I interviewed had a 
refugee background himself, similar to the majority of Catholic Charities’ case-managers. 
Specifically, he was an SIV refugee who came to the United States with advanced linguistic 
skills in English, but also in his native Afghan languages of Daari and Pashtu. Meanwhile, the 
directors of Case-Management and Co-Sponsorship along with assorted IRIS personal, oversaw 
the co-sponsorship group’s resettlement of refugees across Connecticut. This loose structure of 
oversight is characteristic of the co-sponsorship model, which delegates case-management 
responsibilities to community volunteers. Unlike the R & P case-manager, these two IRIS 
employees were native-born, white Americans. Given the employees’ different roles, skills and 
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backgrounds, I will assess IRIS’ R & P and co-sponsorship case-management separately in the 
following sections.  
IRIS Case-Managers and Employees’ Roles and Approaches to Refugee Resettlement  
 IRIS’ (R & P) case-manager explained his ninety-day involvement with mostly SIV 
refugees, along with several “typical” refugee families who “come from African countries, 
Arabic countries, from Syria and Iraq. Different from families with basic “refugee” status, SIV 
holders were often interpreters for American armed forces in the Middle East. The case-manager 
explained: “They [the SIV refugees] had to be very vigilant and careful where they were going 
[in the Middle East] because of their background.” Consequently, many of the SIV refugees 
came to the United States with intense post-traumatic stress, and major disabilities and physical 
injuries. For instance, the case-manager described how he dealt with large families “whose 
children and parents had been burned from explosions and killed.” Similar to Catholic Charities, 
he was required to secure the refugees’ apartment, provide basic furnishing and a culturally 
appropriate meal, and assist the refugees’ in paying their rent with federally allotted welcome 
money.  
When the refugees arrived, the case-manager met them at the airport, and “hit the 
ground” with necessary tasks to complete including social security and welfare enrollment, 
health assessments and vaccinations, and job placement services. In terms of acculturation, the 
case-manager described how he assisted the refugees in learning to “take the the bus, manage 
their money, supervise the kids, and make an appointment.” Fittingly, he characterized this three-
month period as a mechanism to “build their life from zero” and attain “self-sufficiency.” To 
ensure, self-sufficiency, yet provide a support mechanism, the case-manager explained how IRIS 
“had an open-door policy” to address refugees’ issues in their first months. Despite this 
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accessibility, the case-manager described how he required his families to “make an appointment” 
because of his large caseload. In this way, his refugees could take steps towards “self-
sufficiency” in scheduling an appointment and addressing crucially important matters instead of 
discussing concerns in a “random and disorderly way.”  
Contractually, the case-manager explained how he supervised the family for ninety days 
and conducted an in-take 24-hours after arrival, and a 30-day meeting with the refugees to ensure 
their progress towards self-sufficiency. At the in-take meeting, in particular, IRIS employees 
described refugees and case-managers’ rights and legal obligations in the resettlement process. 
After thirty days elapsed, the family was given to IRIS’ post-R & P department. He explained 
how in post-R & P, refugees would receive assistance with employment, apply for green cards, 
citizenship and receive any additional assistance. Interestingly, the case-manager argued how 
IRIS’ approach was less overwhelming for employees because of the organization’s “term of 
reference.” For instance, in other resettlement agencies, he explains: “There is some confusion 
with what the case-manager needs to do with moving the furniture, furnishing the apartment, and 
all the other things you need to do as a case-manager.” At IRIS, however, there are different 
departments that have their specific responsibilities such as “housing and donations” which 
furnishes and sets up the apartment. Consequently, the case-manager describes how he could 
work on achieving refugees’ goals instead of just “completing or checking the box,” which is 
often overwhelming for employees in other agencies.  
In comparison to the R & P case-manager, the IRIS case-management and co-sponsor 
directors were more indirectly involved with refugees’ resettlement during the ninety days. The 
Director of Case Management explained how “her work was more behind the scenes in terms of 
planning and administrative oversight, supporting the staff, helping to make the decision, but 
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IRIS caseworkers worked pretty autonomously.” Furthermore, she only becomes involved when 
clients have “major financial difficulties” or there’s a “compliance issue with a refugee service 
plan.” Day-to-day, however, she is involved with budgeting and paperwork regarding clients and 
their respective case-workers or co-sponsorship groups. Alternatively, the Director of Co-
Sponsorship was more involved in recruiting, training and preparing co-sponsorship groups to 
resettle incoming refugee families. Before confirming and training a co-sponsorship group, IRS 
ensures that groups have raised enough money volunteers, interpreters, and resources to provide 
for a refugee family. Simultaneously, IRIS staff would determine if refugee cases were “good” 
for co-sponsorship, meaning refugees did not have familial connections in Connecticut towns or 
high needs.  
Once a group is given the “green light,” the Director of Co-Sponsorship would conduct a 
single all-day training at IRIS for the co-sponsorship group’s leaders consisting of IRIS staff 
presentations about refugee mental health, employment ESL resources, and case-management, 
among other important areas. When a co-sponsorship group received a refugee family, the 
Director of Co-Sponsorship would meet with the groups’ leaders to discuss any of the family 
members’ major health issues, conditions or disabilities. Furthermore, he visited and checked-in 
with the co-sponsorship group and family within their first ten days in the United States. 
Interestingly, the Director of Co-Sponsorship described the group’s leaders as “case-managers” 
who would help him complete the paperwork that he would otherwise do himself. Indeed, this 
reliability on co-sponsorship members contributed to IRIS’ capacity to resettle 530 refugees 
during 2016 to 2017. Despite IRIS’ trust in its co-sponsorship groups, he explained how “the 
nationals [volags] get nervous” about entrusting so much responsibility in volunteers. IRIS, he 
described, operates in “good faith” that its co-sponsorship groups will follow its guidelines and 
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timeline for resettling refugees. In fact, IRIS’ co-sponsorship timeline is one-year, in which the 
Director of Co-Sponsorship or other caseworkers, are required to check-in after three, six and 
one-year. After one-year, IRIS expects the co-sponsorship group to detach themselves from their 
case-management role with the family.  
Both the Directors of Case-Management and Co-Sponsorship held similar beliefs to one 
another concerning refugee self-sufficiency and approaches to resettlement. First, they 
emphasized the importance of community support and involvement in IRIS’ organization and 
initiatives. The Director of Case-Management explained: “For various reasons, a lot of other 
agencies are more inward looking. They see volunteers as trouble-makers because they demand 
so much attention, ask questions and sometimes don’t really know what they’re talking about.”  
At IRIS, however, she described how that is “not our approach” and “we want people to get 
involved.” With IRIS’ recruitment of community volunteers, the agency was able to notify the 
State Department that Connecticut could accept more Syrian refugees in 2016. The Director of 
Case-Management added: “There are 48 co-sponsorship groups, that’s 48 points of advocacy 
across the state.”  With these points of advocacy, refugees can access social support, networking 
and resources to facilitate their integration. Furthermore, he emphasized the importance of 
“educating the public” to allow people to understand, welcome and assist refugees in their 
adaptation to the United States. While both professionals were supportive of IRIS’ community-
based model, they also underlined the importance of promoting refugee self-sufficiency.  
The Director of Case-Management, stated: “It [refugee resettlement] has to be a 
partnership. You need to help yourself, you know as much as we [IRIS] want to help you 
[refugees].” In other words, refugees must be willing to work hard to attain employment and 
English proficiency, the United States Resettlement Program’s two major goals. Consequently, 
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she explained how IRIS prioritizes finding employment over all else because the “quicker they 
work, the fewer public benefits they will need.”  Despite these federal policy pressures, the 
Director of Case Management described how IRIS wants to “teach people to do things, so they 
can do it themselves, but we don’t force people to do it themselves.” Furthermore, she explains 
how this balance of support and self-sufficiency is complicated, but serves as a tool for 
facilitating refugee integration.  
In comparison, the Director of Co-Sponsorship’s approach to self-sufficiency was more 
intertwined with the co-sponsorship group and their respective families. Specifically, he 
addressed the issue of co-sponsorship group’s continued subsidization of families or “over-
giving” to the refugee families. When groups continue to finance their families, he describes, it is 
much harder to detach themselves when they run out of money. Furthermore, this “approach” is 
not promoting refugee economic independence or self-sufficiency. With this everlasting support, 
“refugees cannot push themselves to assess resources” an indicator of self-sufficiency and 
independence.  
Views on Refugee Integration 
Taken together, the R & P case-manager, and two IRIS Directors held that English 
proficiency/ESL and employment were the most important indicators of refugee integration. The 
IRIS employees also emphasized the interconnection between ESL and employment. The case-
manager explains: “You [the refugee] must not be dependent on the department of social services 
and speak the language so you can interact with Americans.” Without language, “refugees are 
isolated from the society and adjustment does not happen, or it will happen in a very slow pace.” 
In the R & P program, the case-manager emphasized that IRIS offers a “Parents Literacy 
Program” which offers daycare, and at-night English classes. Furthermore, it is particularly 
	 68 
geared towards “mothers coming from a Middle Eastern country, who are completely illiterate 
with little kids.” In relation to co-sponsorship, the Directors emphasized how the co-sponsorship 
group deals with refugee job placement and ESL acquisition. The Co-Sponsorship Director, 
however, reiterated the importance of co-sponsors in securing refugee attendance in local adult-
ESL, not just in-group tutoring. 
 Besides employment and English, the IRIS employees mentioned financial literacy, good 
housing, transportation, and social support as important resources for refugee integration. 
Ultimately, the Director of Co-Sponsorship elaborated: “Integration…refers to refugees being 
able to get around and access resources.” Moreover, it is important for “refugees to have friends” 
or social support to assist them in accessing these resources. Specifically, she explained how 
IRIS offers some wellness activities such as “sewing, exercise, yoga, soccer and gardening” so 
that refugees can do an activity but also interact with others. In addition, IRIS offered cultural-
companion programming, which matches volunteers with clients and is mostly for those refugees 
without social or co-sponsorship support. The IRIS director described how most of these psycho-
social wellness activities are organized within the co-sponsorship group.  
Based off these interpretations of integration, the IRIS employees assessed the 
acculturation challenges refugees are still facing. The R & P case-manager, for instance, 
described how Middle Eastern female refugees are still struggling to integrate: “these special 
immigrant visa holders, all of them came from Afghanistan, most of them are coming from the 
country side. Back home, the females are badly isolated, socially.” Therefore, female Afghani 
SIV refugees are often “illiterate back home, and they haven’t gone to school.” With small 
children, it is difficult for this small population to “confidently work on their English.” Indeed, 
the case-manager relays how the IRIS’ Cultural Companion program was geared towards 
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allowing Americans and Afghan women to engage in reciprocal learning and acculturation. In 
contrast, he reports that both men and women from urban Afghanistan, are highly-educated, thus 
rapidly acculturating in the United States.   
In general, refugee education-level has been a hindrance to integration in the co-
sponsorship groups. The Director of Co-Sponsorship elaborated how “If you have a large family 
and they’re living in a really expensive area and they don’t speak English, and the guy was like a 
laborer and doesn’t read that’s very challenging.” Indeed, he admits how the Syrian refugee 
population had been “less-educated” than people originally thought. Given IRIS’ surge of Syrian 
refugee arrivals in 2016, “people were resettled all over the place” and in areas of Connecticut 
that were “too remote and isolated.” This remoteness and isolation, in consequence, has 
compromised refugees’ ability to access sustainable resources. The Director of Case-
Management also reiterated the importance of refugees’ having reliable transportation whether 
that is a bus or car, to “move efficiently.”  Without fully considering municipalities’ cost of 
living, educational system or public amenities, some refugees’ have struggled to integrate into 
American society. Despite these challenges, the Director of Co-Sponsorship credits Syrian 
refugees for “being robust, gritty people” who want to “make things work and not back away.” 
Refugee personality and disposition, he explains, also plays a crucial role in refugees’ attaining 
ESL, and educational and employment opportunities.  
Challenges Facing IRIS  
 Similar to Catholic Charities, IRIS discussed its pressing challenges in terms of national 
policy. Specifically, the Director of Case-Management described how President Trump’s 
lowered refugee ceiling, travel bans and executive orders have led to IRIS’ downsizing its 
operations. Unlike Catholic Charities, IRIS is still resettling refugees, and has a steady stream of 
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incoming SIV refugees. Nonetheless the “one-hundred or more rule,” which stipulates that if an 
affiliate receives less than one-hundred refugees in less than a year, it will not be allowed to 
resettle refugees, has been enforced upon Catholic Charities. Consequently, IRIS is now 
receiving Catholic Charities clients, which include a large amount of Congolese and Afghan 
refugees. Promoting the co-sponsorship model to potential congregations, however, has been 
difficult. Interestingly, the Director of Co-Sponsorship explains how many groups “assume” that 
the United States is not receiving refugees given the Trump Administration’s immigration 
policies. Consequently, IRIS’ community outreach and public relations role has become 
somewhat complicated.  Meanwhile, the Director of Case-Management explained how IRIS has 
dealt with never-ending uncertainty in relation to the “one hundred or more rule.” This 
uncertainty, she explains, makes it difficult for IRIS staff to operate in an effective manner.  
 Together, Catholic Charities’ and IRIS’ institutional framework differ on the basis of 
organization, resources, and oversight. Organizationally, Catholic Charities’ has a single group 
of caseworkers, which handles all of the refugees’ needs within their first ninety-days. While 
IRIS’ R&P caseworkers also work with refugees within this ninety-day period, their 
responsibilities are not all-encompassing. At IRIS, departments focusing on specific areas of 
resettlement assistance such as housing and donations, and energy assistance, mitigate the 
caseworker’s responsibilities. Therefore, IRIS R&P caseworkers can focus more on refugee 
employment, and English proficiency, instead of immediate needs such as housing and 
furnishing. IRIS co-sponsorship program offers community-based more resources than Catholic 
Charities’ case-management model. For about a year, volunteers are highly involved in the 
resettlement and adaptation of a refugee family who they assist with employment, healthcare, 
education, and English among other areas. Conversely, a single case-manager at Catholic 
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Charities handles the needs of many refugee families within a three months. In terms of 
oversight, IRIS’s R&P case-managers, and Catholic Charities’ typical case-managers have 
similar oversight roles. Both are required to conduct mandatory, and periodic “check-ins” and 
assist refugees with different areas of integration. The approach of Catholic Charities, however, 
is much more detached than IRIS, which promotes an “open door policy” instead of “discharge 
from day 1.” Moreover, in IRIS co-sponsorship, case-managers are mostly uninvolved in the 
group’s day-to-day activities. To an extent, IRIS volunteers become their own “case-managers” 
who assist refugees in recreating their lives in America.  
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CHAPTER 3: THE VOLUNTEERS 
The Co-Sponsorship Model and Volunteer Networking 
 While refugee admissions have lowered, IRIS co-sponsors, along with other Connecticut 
private volunteer networks, have played crucial roles in welcoming, resettling, and assisting 
refugees. Indeed, advocacy and acceptance have been principal tenets for volunteers’ 
involvement in IRIS’ co-sponsorship model. Accordingly, IRIS’ model encourages community 
members to become involved with refugees, thus recruiting and committing volunteers to their 
resettlement. As members of local host communities, volunteers play an important role in 
effective long-term refugee resettlement and integration. From taking refugee children to soccer 
practice to enrolling parents in Driver’s Education classes, volunteers are intimately involved 
with their family’s daily tasks, goals and resettlement challenges. This level of commitment, in 
turn, improves refugee economic, linguistic, and social integration outcomes.  
In total, I interviewed six co-sponsorship volunteers belonging to three different groups: 
Saint James/Saint Johns, Beth El Temple and Westminster Presbyterian and Manchester 
Unitarian Universalist. Four out of the six IRIS co-sponsorship volunteers were involved with 
private volunteering and projects outside of their refugee family. Four out of six of the volunteers 
were members of Saint James Episcopal Church in West Hartford, which co-sponsored a Syrian 
family in 2016. The other volunteers became involved with refugees via Beth El Temple and 
Westminster Presbyterian Church, an interfaith IRIS co-sponsorship group based in West 
Hartford. All six volunteers, however were mostly white highly-educated, upper middle-class 
white women (with the exception of one male volunteer). The reasons for the volunteers’ 
involvement were multiple and included academic/professional interest, retirement projects, ESL 
teaching experience, Middle Eastern cultural identity, and Jewish refugee background. One of 
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the women involved with the Saint James/Saint John’s co-sponsorship group was Miriam who 
later became an important activist for many refugees in the greater Hartford Area. Linguistically, 
Miriam was the only co-sponsorship volunteer who spoke Arabic. Nonetheless, two of the 
women spoke other languages (i.e. Russian and Italian) and spent considerable time studying 
abroad in different cultures. All of the women were interconnected through their refugee 
involvement and advocacy in the Greater Hartford area.  
Table 3.1: Co-Sponsor Volunteers and their their Religious Congregations  
Saint James and Saint John’s Episcopal Church Group, West Hartford, 
Volunteer 1, Private-Sponsorship  
Volunteer 2, Private Sponsorship 
Volunteer 3, (Miriam*- pseudonym for volunteer involved with 80+ families) Private Sponsorship   
Volunteer 4, No Private Sponsorship  
Beth al Temple and Westminster Presbyterian Group, West Hartford,  
Volunteer 5, Private-Sponsorship 
Unitarian Universalist Church, Manchester  
Volunteer 6, No Private Sponsorship  
 
Co-Sponsors’ Roles and Approaches to Refugee Resettlement  
 In all three co-sponsorship groups, the volunteers expressed the intensity of working with 
their refugee family upon their arrival to the United States. Prior to the refugees’ arrival, the co-
sponsorship groups were organized by committees, or groups of volunteers centered on different 
refugee projects (i.e. children’s school enrollment, vaccinations, bus transportation). The 
committees centered around themes of health, employment, social service determination 
education, and general acculturation. These co-sponsorship groups secured apartments in West 
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Hartford and Manchester, and raised money to fund their family’s expenses. Although the co-
sponsorship group organized committees, volunteers described how when the refugees arrived, it 
was “all hands on deck.” That being said, in the Saint James/Johns co-sponsorship group, three 
of the four co-chairmen of the co-sponsorship committee were on vacation when the refugees 
arrived. Miriam described: “The two rectors from Saint James/John’s co-sponsorship were on 
vacation and all the second-level people that I had put in line for transportation, taking the kids to 
school, donating, health issues, all that stuff, they were not available.” Indeed, Volunteer 1 
described how she had not been involved in the first couple months because her family was on 
vacation. In the first few months, the co-sponsorship group was focused on securing the family’s 
social security cards, DSS benefits and health appointments. Volunteer 2 described these tasks as 
a “trial by fire,” which many of the volunteers in the co-sponsorship group could not handle. 
Consequently, after the first six months, the majority of the co-sponsorship groups had 
dismantled leaving tasks to its most devoted members. Or, alternatively, some members were 
more highly involved leaving less work for others. This restructuring of involvement, 
nonetheless, resulted in smaller, more close-knit volunteering with the Saint Johns/James family.  
 After the first six months of resettlement, all of the co-sponsorship volunteers described 
how they readjusted their approaches in assisting the refugee families. Given the enormity of co-
sponsors’ tasks, some volunteers focused on fostering refugee independence in completing tasks.  
In the Saint James/John co-sponsorship group, Volunteer 2 described how she would solely 
assist refugees with ESL-related tasks. Furthermore, if a refugee asked her to complete a major 
task outside of her ESL/education role, she would tell the refugees to contact other volunteers. 
Alternatively, in the Beth El Temple/Westminster Presbyterian group, Volunteer 5 describes: 
“They’re a little bit dependent on me because I help them tremendously with a lot of things.” 
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Offering a generational approach to the Saint James/John group responsibilities, Volunteer 4 
described how he and other retired men assisted the refugee father with learning English five 
days a week. Likewise, Volunteer 6, in the Manchester group, described how her retirement 
allowed her to assist the family during the day when other volunteers were at work.  
 Despite volunteers mixed roles and approaches towards self-sufficiency, the co-
sponsorship group was readily-available to fulfill the family’s major needs. In one scenario, a 
Volunteer 2 described how “she had dropped her family plans to assist the family with an urgent 
medical need.” Furthermore, Volunteer 1 described her odd balancing act between her own 
children and refugee children’s school events and activities.  In the Saint James/John group, this 
need-based approach has currently manifested into assisting families with sporadic projects such 
as social service redetermination, airfare loan budgeting and repayment and employment change. 
While the all-encompassing, the volunteers’ intense commitment to the refugee families’ has 
benefited the refugees’ integration outcomes and independence. Volunteer 5 explained: “It’s sad 
I only see them once every few weeks. Now they just text me questions.” As of now, the 
volunteers described how their acculturation roles have become nuanced and focused on 
refugees’ long-term goals.  
Views on Refugee Integration  
 Describing their experiences working with refugees, the volunteers thoroughly addressed 
the achievements and challenges to refugees’ integration. Two of the volunteers emphasized the 
importance of the social service sector in facilitating refugee integration. Specifically, Volunteer 
2 emphasized the importance of Husky (Medicaid) in covering the refugees’ extensive medical 
and dental procedures. She explained how it was her “mission” to make refugees’ cognizant of 
how “lucky” they are to have this social service resource. While some volunteers’ emphasized 
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the importance of refugee social services, a couple of the women were deeply critical of the 
American welfare system. For instance, Volunteer 1 stated: Social service systems are so flawed, 
so inadequate, and so I personally, I was shocked by how bad it was.” Consequently, all of the 
volunteers underlined the importance of the co-sponsorship group in assisting refugees’ in 
navigating the social service sector.  
In general, volunteers also highlighted the importance of social connection in improving 
refugee employment prospects and ESL/educational improvement. Volunteer 4 reiterated this 
point: “You see how the most successful families, were resettled by really resource-based, kind 
of connected volunteers.” Indeed, in the Saint James/John co-sponsorship group, volunteers 
utilized their networks to assist the refugee father in obtaining a manufacturing job, which 
matched his Syrian professional experience. Linguistically, volunteers 1 and 4 described how 
their family’s English acquisition was dependent on the co-sponsorship group’s stream of private 
tutors and availability/transportation. Specifically, the group’s commitment to driving refugees to 
ESL classes or organizing tutoring lessons improved refugees’ English-speaking skills. 
Furthermore, all of the volunteers discussed the ineffectiveness of Catholic Charities in 
providing refugees with integration resources, services and social networks. Indeed, the Catholic 
Charities families’ lack of resources is what motivated volunteers to become involved in 
assisting Connecticut refugees on a larger-scale.  
 While the volunteers emphasized the refugees’ integration achievements, they 
acknowledged continuing integration challenges for refugees in Connecticut. In terms of refugee 
employment, Volunteers 2 and 4 underlined the families’ vulnerability of being “working-poor.” 
Specifically, volunteer 2 explained how refugees were often “one-paycheck” away from an 
“economic crisis” or not being able to pay expenses. Even when refugees had stable fully-
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benefited jobs, their salaries often fell below the federal poverty level. While the volunteers 
discussed how many refugee women desired to work, they explained how expensive 
daycare/childcare stifled their plans.  
Culturally, volunteers also explained how refugees’ ideas of financial planning and 
decision-making often differed from Americans. Volunteer 2, for instance, explained her 
frustrations with one family “buying an expensive $30,000 car.” Although she supported the 
family’s decision to buy a car, she explained how “other volunteers” may wonder why this 
family is continuing to receive social services. She also explained how many refugee families’ 
ideals of economic integration fundamentally differed from that of volunteers. Being forced to 
leave their homes, some refugees had much higher standards of living in Syria. Volunteer 2 
attributed the refugee’s struggles to Connecticut’s lack of affordable housing for the urban poor 
and refugee individuals. She explained: “It’s very hard to find good housing, or cheap housing 
for refugees.” Indeed, refugees’ initial lack of credit and employment history makes it difficult 
for landlords to rent their apartments. Consequently, by being resettled in poorer municipalities, 
refugees’ housing costs are lowered, yet their access to educational and employment 
opportunities are hindered. The combined inaccessibility of good housing, employment, and 
educational resources complicates refugees’ resettlement regardless of being resettled by IRIS or 
Catholic Charities. Having networked co-sponsorship groups, however, as the volunteers 
emphasized, improves refugees’ social mobility.  
Challenges of Co-Sponsorship  
 In discussing their co-sponsorship roles and responsibilities, the volunteers addressed two 
major concerns: (1) volunteer turnover and cultural misunderstanding (2) and lack of IRIS 
training and oversight. In the Saint James/John co-sponsorship group, Volunteer 2 explained how 
	 78 
“in the beginning there were 82 co-sponsorship volunteers” signed up to assist their refugee 
family. Quickly, Volunteer 2 and 4 elaborated how their co-sponsorship group’s volunteer 
network began to “fizzle out.” For many individuals, fully dedicating to assisting refugee 
families is a time commitment they cannot make with their families, professional roles and 
personal activities. Volunteer 4 explained: “the women involved with assisting refugees can do a 
lot and are maybe a little bit obsessive and really passionate because a lot of people just can’t 
handle all the chaos.” That being said, she emphasized how all of these women volunteers 
(including herself) have children, professions and are politically active. Interestingly, Volunteer 
4 also questioned the gendered dynamic of refugee assistance by pointing out how the male 
volunteers had mostly detached themselves in her co-sponsorship group. While she was unsure 
why this exactly is, she emphasized the importance of volunteers being able to multi-task 
responsibilities, a task she claimed that “women are better with.”  
In addition to issues of volunteer detachment, Volunteer 1 explained the issue of “bottle-
necking” in the Saint James/John co-sponsorship group. Specifically, she explained how many 
volunteers would rely on Miriam to communicate with the family because of her impressive bi-
cultural and bi-lingual skills. Miriam’s volunteer involvement with many refugee families, 
however, made it difficult for her to always respond to the Saint James/John family. 
Furthermore, Volunteer 1 explained how “so few people are willing, or feel comfortable…being 
with the family on a weekly basis.” Despite Volunteer 1’s lack of Arabic-speaking skills, she 
was able to effectively communicate and develop a personal relationship with the family. 
Consequently, she exclaimed how many volunteers began relying on her to communicate with 
the family even though she had the exact “linguistic skill-set” as everyone else.  
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Furthermore, some volunteers were “quick to judge” refugee families based on their 
cultural differences. For instance, Volunteer 1 explained how ESL tutors often made cultural 
criticisms of the family’s childcare. In one scenario, a volunteer complained about the time of the 
day that the family was bathing their children. Similarly, Volunteer 6, in the Manchester 
Unitarian Universalist Church, described how she was also a “mediator” between cultural 
conflicts which arose between volunteers and the refugee family. Interestingly, Volunteer 1 
suggesting this “bottle-neck effect” and cultural misunderstanding resonated from the difficulty 
of communicating between congregational volunteers. She explains, “I very much operate in a 
professional realm, I use Google Docs…many elderly church-goers do not even use email.” In 
fact, the communicative gap within the co-sponsorship group made her “appreciative” of how 
religious leaders coordinate with and strengthen their religious communities. 
Given the enormity of the co-sponsorship group’s tasks, all of the volunteers explained 
how IRIS could have been more involved and helpful in their family’s resettlement. In the Saint 
James/John’s co-sponsorship group, for instance, Volunteer 1 described how volunteers were 
concerned with some of the refugee family’s personal and mental health issues. “At the end of 
their rope,” the volunteers contacted their family’s IRIS case-manager for assistance in handling 
this difficult situation. Instead of offering constructive advice, the IRIS caseworker sharply 
criticized Volunteer 1, telling her that “interacting with the family several times a week” was 
creating a situation of “co-dependency.” Indeed, Volunteer 1 explained how the meeting was 
“very upsetting” and provided no mechanisms to resolve situation. Furthermore, both Volunteer 
1 and 4 described how IRIS had provided the group with limited pre and post-arrival training in 
light of their enormous resettlement task. Volunteer 4 explains: “IRIS wasn’t that helpful. Once 
they got them here, they provided us with very little, support and guidance.” Specifically, the 
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caseworkers assigned to both co-sponsorship groups “made two visits to the home and after six 
months they were gone.” While IRIS’ delegation of tasks to co-sponsorship groups allowed the 
organization to resettle more families from 2016 to 2017, co-sponsorship groups were left with 
very little assistance in their resettlement task.   
Private Volunteering and Refugee Activism  
 Outside of their co-sponsorship groups, four of the volunteers (all women) have become 
highly involved in refugee resettlement in the Greater Hartford Area. These women privately 
volunteer in three, overlapping areas: (1) networking with, and recruiting volunteers to assist 
refugees (2) providing direct assistance to needy families (3), and securing housing and 
relocating refugee families. The first area, networking with, and recruiting volunteers to assist 
families, refers to the women’s communication and outreach role. All four women were involved 
in this role in varying capacities. For instance, Volunteer 1 described how her strengths were best 
utilized in recruiting volunteers to assist Catholic Charities families. Unlike the IRIS co-
sponsorship families, she explained how families resettled by Catholic Charities received very 
limited financial assistance, job opportunities, ESL instruction or psycho-social support. After 
learning about WHOKE and Forward CT, two politically-active women’s groups focused on 
migrant/refugee issues, she decided to connect them with Catholic Charities families. In this 
way, the families could receive additional resources unavailable through their Catholic Charities 
case-managers. Furthermore, Volunteer 2 explained how she also involved with the “volunteer 
management” of these “ad hoc, amorphous, amoeba-like groups.” Specifically, she applied IRIS’ 
co-sponsorship principles and committee-structure to organize these volunteer groups. Indeed, 
Volunteer 4 exclaimed how amazing these volunteer groups were and how “they had resources 
and networking beyond anything that I ever had.”  
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In relation to networking, Volunteer 4 explained how she has been involved in the 
“Refugee Advocacy” WhatsApp group, in which volunteers post information related to refugees 
across Connecticut. The volunteer listed the current messages in the group: “Let’s see, washing 
machine that’s broken, people need comforters and diapers, rugs, cribs, a truck to move furniture 
to a new home, somebody needs to have their electric bill paid.” In effect, this group-chat has 
been a forum for organizing and collaborating among volunteers across the state. All four 
women are members of this group-chat who assist these refugees, both directly and indirectly, by 
donating items, paying expenses, and providing transportation.  
 Besides the group-chat, two of the volunteers were directly involved with providing 
assistance to struggling refugee families. For instance, Volunteer 2 recalls how she helps about 
twenty-five Catholic Charities families with navigating the Department of Social Services (DSS). 
Interestingly, she described her role as a “second tier person” who assists refugees in social 
service redetermination when glitches in the DSS computer system “boot refugees off.” In this 
way, she ensures that refugees are receiving their Husky renewals, food stamps, and temporary 
cash assistance (TANF). Additionally, she has been helping some Catholic Charities families 
with specific projects such as securing social security benefits for an Autistic child, assisting 
refugee women in enrolling in community college, and negotiating parking tickets. Outside of 
these formal roles, she assists refugees sporadically with childcare, transportation and medical 
emergencies.  
Along with Volunteer 2, Miriam has been heavily involved with more than eighty refugee 
families in Connecticut, New England and even the Middle East. Indeed, all of the volunteers 
described how Miriam has committed her life to assisting refugees in whatever capacity: 
housing, donations, tutoring, DSS, and advocacy services (among many other areas). During our 
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interview, Miriam described how her volunteering has operated under her organization, Refugee 
Advocacy Services (RAS). RAS, which means “head” in Arabic, is her refugee volunteer 
organization for which she plans to secure a 501 (C3), a non-profit documentation. In the future, 
Miriam hopes to expand RAS’ volunteering capacity and add a business sector, which involves 
the retail of Muslim women clothing. She explained: There’s so many women who want 
clothing, they want to go to the store, or they order something overseas and it gets here and it’s 
the wrong size. Miriam emphasized that her business motivation is to employ refugee women to 
work for $15/hour (the ideal minimum wage). In this way, refugee women will be able to 
provide their families with additional income and economic independence.  
 Miriam, however, was the only volunteer directly involved with relocating refugee 
families and securing housing. Indeed, Miriam went into depth about her process of “finding 
families” who were resettled by both Catholic Charities and IRIS. In effect, much of Miriam’s 
“finding” entailed relocating the refugees’ from their Hartford housing to apartments in West 
Hartford. Miriam explained one scenario: “There was a four-person family living on a third-floor 
walk-up with no elevator, a pregnant mother, an energetic three-year-old son, and a little girl 
who has cerebral palsy and can’t walk three steps.” Enraged, she called the Catholic Charities 
case-manager and told them how the family’s situation was illegal under the Americans with 
Disabilities Act (ADA). In response, the Catholic Charities case-manager vaguely explained how 
they “would take care of it.” After waiting several weeks, Miriam rented a truck and hired 
several moving men to relocate the family. In another scenario, Miriam described how she 
moved a family from their Hartford apartment which “smelled like marijuana.” She expressed 
how she was concerned with the neighborhood’s criminal activity and did not want Syrian 
	 83 
families’ teenage boys to become involved with dealing drugs. Whether or not this concern was 
well-founded, Miriam moved the family to an apartment in West Harford.  
Because of her relocation initiatives, Miriam explains how she has made a “name for 
herself” at Catholic Charities, and even at IRIS. Recently, Miriam staged a sit-in at Catholic 
Charities’ Archbishop’s office in response to the organizations’ mistreatment of its refugee 
clients. Candidly, Miriam relayed her attitude about others’ opinions regarding her relocation 
initiatives, “If you’re with me great, if you’re not with me just step aside.”  
In contrast to Miriam, other volunteers have been hesitant to confront Catholic Charities. 
For instance, Volunteer 2 explains, “I never felt it necessary to call them [Catholic Charities] and 
see what they were doing. I didn’t want to step on their toes.” Furthermore, Volunteer 1 
expressed her reluctance with Miriam’s crusade to relocate refugees to West Hartford. 
Specifically, she references the racial segregation and inequity of Hartford and West Hartford’s 
resources. By relocating refugees, who are a “mechanism for community revitalization,” in her 
words, volunteers are depriving Hartford of crucial social and economic resources. As we can 
see, the volunteers work in accordance, but also in disagreement over different volunteering 
missions and objectives. Despite these challenges, the volunteers’ collective actions have been 
immense in promoting large-scale refugee integration in the Greater Hartford area.  
The Private Sponsors 
Similar to IRIS co-sponsorship groups, grassroots private sponsorship groups, have 
become greatly involved in advancing refugee integration outcomes. Matching resettled refugees 
to volunteers, these private networks have assisted refugees in accessing employment, 
healthcare, education and ESL opportunities in the Hartford Area. In total, I interviewed three 
individuals involved with three informal private sponsorship networks: the Berlin-Avon Mosque 
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Association (BAMA), Forward CT and WHOKE. Similar to IRIS co-sponsorship groups, 
BAMA has a religious volunteer base and organizes through various Hartford-area Muslim 
congregations. That being said, BAMA has no co-sponsorship ties to IRIS and mainly assists 
needy refugee families associated with Catholic Charities. Indeed, religious beliefs have been 
motivators for BAMA volunteers’ involvement in local refugee resettlement. Specifically, the 
BAMA volunteer explained how zakat, a charitable/religious tax and service, has propelled many 
mosque members to become involved with refugees in different capacities. Some members 
donate large sums of money to refugees whereas others spend time assisting refugee families. 
The BAMA volunteers described how mosque members “would take a few [Catholic Charities] 
families to be responsible for.” In her interactions with refugees, the BAMA volunteer describes 
how she was “shocked” with the struggles of one Catholic Charities family whose members were 
all disabled. With little assistance from their Catholic Charities’ case-manager, this BAMA 
volunteer was motivated to become involved with assisting families with disabilities.  
Interestingly, Forward CT and WHOKE have no religious affiliation and are primarily 
composed of white, upper-middle class, politically-active women. After President Trump’s 
election in 2016, both grassroots organizations mobilized to assist immigrants and refugees. 
Forward CT, an Avon-based advocacy group coalesced around migration issues, whereas 
WHOKE, an existent West Hartford women’s group, decided to tackle this specific issue. 
Forward CT began assisting refugees by creating “care packages,” which included important 
household items (i.e. cleaning supplies, toiletries etc). Meanwhile, WHOKE initially focused on 
petitioning West Hartford officials to become a sanctuary city, a municipality which limits their 
cooperation with national immigration enforcement policies. After unsuccessfully presenting a 
petition to West Hartford’s Mayor and Chief of Police, WHOKE looked for other ways to assist 
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migrants. After networking with various co-sponsorship volunteers, both Forward CT and 
WHOKE became connected with a few Catholic Charities refugee families.  
While academic literature suggests that refugee social capital is mainly tied to religious 
congregations, these two secular networks have assisted refugee families by providing housing, 
donations, employment, and transportation (Ives et 2012; Eby et al. 2011). The WHOKE 
volunteer explains her frustration with religious-based resettlement, “Everything was via 
churches and…through the mosque, so there’s a lot of atheists here and we’re unaffiliated, but 
politically active, and you’re [co-sponsorship groups] missing an opportunity to use our energy.” 
Although Forward CT and WHOKE are non-denominational, the private sponsors had their own 
personal reasons for assisting refugees. The Forward CT private sponsor explains how her 
Jewish background made her empathetic to the war occurring in Syria. She explains, “You know 
what if nobody helped us, or my people during the Holocaust…if you don’t step up who’s going 
to help right now?” Similarly, the WHOKE private sponsor describes relates her experience as a 
Russian-Jewish refugee in the 1970s as one of her main motivations to help Syrian refugees.  
Private Sponsors’ Roles and Approaches to Refugee Resettlement  
 Unlike the co-sponsorship groups, the private volunteer networks, with the exception of 
the Berlin Avon Mosque Association (BAMA), became involved with helping refugees after 
their first month in the United States. Indeed, BAMA had a close relationship with Catholic 
Charities case-managers in assisting refugee families in their first month of arrival. The BAMA 
volunteer explains how the refugees’ first month was “very tough” because they dealt with 
tragedies and post-traumatic stress. In addition, she explains how many of the families struggled 
because they did not how to write or read in Arabic, had no English language, transportation, 
social connection, and were placed in “bad areas” in Hartford. Specifically, the BAMA volunteer 
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explains how many of the Catholic Charities’ Hartford apartments were full of mice and bed 
bugs. The mosques “had to fight” with Catholic Charities for them to return the refugees’ 
security deposits on their initial apartments. She explains that the “tragedy was with the Catholic 
Charities not the IRIS families.” In assisting refugees, the BAMA volunteer provided 
multifaceted support through monetary/furniture donations, Arabic translation services, ESL 
tutoring and navigation of the employment, healthcare and social service sectors.   
 While the BAMA volunteer explained how she was highly involved with refugees during 
their first months, her long-term approach in assisting the refugees evolved. She explains, “You 
become very close to the families, but at the same time, I kept my limit because the families 
depend on you with everything.” Indeed, the BAMA volunteer was weary of situations of co-
dependency in which the refugees will “not be pushing themselves to work, or pushing 
themselves to learn the language.” Nonetheless, she elaborated that the refuges have her phone 
and with anything important she helps, though with some tasks such as transportation, she is 
attempting “to start letting go.” Dealing with many refugees with disabilities, the BAMA 
volunteer described how their inability to work induced major challenges, so it is difficult for her 
to “let go completely.” Interestingly, she described when she wants to leave, “something always 
pulls her back to stay.” As we can see, this volunteer’s personal relationships with several 
families complicate her ability to balance refugee needs while promoting self-sufficiency in an 
effective way.  
 Alongside the mosques, Forward CT and WHOKE became involved with Catholic 
Charities refugee families after their first month in the United States. In fact, Miriam and other 
co-sponsorship volunteers became aware of struggling Catholic Charities refugee families and 
put them in connection with both groups. Interestingly, both the Forward CT and WHOKE 
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volunteers explained how their relationship with refugees were centered on the “nuts and bolts” 
of their resettlement, as opposed to being a “cultural ambassador” for the families. For instance, 
the Forward CT volunteer explained how much of her work was helping the group’s refugee 
family navigate food stamps, pay electric bills, obtain a credit card, and schedule a driver’s test 
among other important tasks. For the WHOKE volunteer, she described how their first month of 
involvement was “putting out fires.” Unlike Forward CT, the WHOKE group worked with two 
different families and immediately began re-locating the families to West Hartford to access 
better apartments and public schools. With bed bugs and vermin, both refugee families expressed 
their discomfort living in their Hartford apartments. Simultaneously, the WHOKE volunteer 
addressed refugees’ medical appointments, social service redetermination and educational 
necessities. Given these demands, both the Forward CT and WHOKE volunteers characterized 
their first months as a demanding and chaotic time period.  
 In adjusting to the families’ needs, both groups attempted to create formal mechanisms to 
organize in assisting refugees. The Forward CT group received advice from IRIS co-sponsorship 
volunteers and created sub-groups within their volunteer network. The Forward CT volunteer 
described, “there was a job team that worked on the resume…there was the ESL team who 
helped with language…and there was the medical team which helped with appointments.” 
Likewise, in the WHOKE group, volunteers initially organized themselves by families and 
different medical, housing or employment commissions, which were all working on different 
projects. WHOKE also adapted this structure from other IRIS co-sponsorship volunteers and 
IRIS’ co-sponsorship manual. While the WHOKE volunteers had some success with this 
structure, the refugee families tended to reach out to certain volunteers, rather than always 
contacting the relevant committee leaders. Ultimately, the WHOKE volunteer described their 
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group as a “kind of loose, fluid rotation” in assisting refugees. By structuring their tasks, 
however, volunteers were able to more cohesively address refugees’ needs instead of constantly 
“putting out fires.”  
 After their first months of assistance, the WHOKE volunteer described how she 
attempted to promote refugee self-sufficiency at the micro-level. In one example, WHOKE 
volunteers promoted independence by providing refugees’ detailed directions on how to get to 
the doctor’s office, but not transporting them. Once at the doctor’s office, WHOKE volunteers 
would meet them, but refugees had to practice filling out medical history forms on their own. In 
this way, refugees could have opportunities to advocate for themselves and practice their English 
in real-life scenarios. The volunteer even described how she would “bargain” with refugees 
about completing certain tasks, so they could also practice their English.  Despite these efforts, 
the volunteer described how other private sponsor volunteers sometimes interrupted these self-
sufficiency steps. For instance, one private sponsor would give refugees rides to appointments or 
fill out their medical history forms, thus disrupting these self-sufficiency tasks. Indeed, 
WHOKE’s approach was sometimes at odds with Catholic Charities and other private sponsor’s 
approaches. The WHOKE volunteer explained how there are two extremes of refugee 
approaches: (1) Catholic Charities providing refugees with “no assistance whatsoever” (2) and, 
private sponsors immediately “patching” refugees’ needs. Specifically, she described how 
“playing whack-a-mole” with refugees’ reoccurring needs does not provide them with tools to 
solve their issues.  
 Compared to the WHOKE volunteer, the Forward CT volunteer provided fewer details 
about her approach to refugee self-sufficiency. Both women, however, emphasized the 
importance of providing refugees assistance past volags’ typical three-month resettlement period. 
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The Forward CT volunteer emphasized this point: “The model where you bring someone in and 
give them some help for a few months, and then you walk out the door does not work.” In 
addition, both women were critical of USRP’s goal of self-sufficiency. She explained how it is 
unrealistic to assume that refugees, let alone American citizens, can overcome such pervasive 
obstacles of financial stability and foreign language (English) proficiency in a 90-day time 
period. The CT Forward volunteer also elaborated that self-sufficiency varies with a family’s 
socioeconomic status, linguistic/educational background and social relationships. 
Private Sponsors’ Views on Refugee Integration  
 Private sponsors’ views on refugee economic integration varied by family. Both the 
BAMA and WHOKE volunteers explained how refugees with medical ailments and disabilities 
are still economically struggling. Unfortunately, many of these refugees are unable to work and 
rely on public benefits to sustain their families. Despite these challenges, some refugee families 
have received substantial monetary assistance from BAMA. With a BAMA WhatsApp group, 
volunteers can post refugees’ electric bills, apartment rent and grocery needs. The BAMA 
volunteer explains: “When I post in the group people will give me the money or Venmo me.” In 
some scenarios, “people are very generous, like you ask for $500, and you will receive maybe 
$1,000 or $2,000.” The trust among mosque volunteers that enables large donations has allowed 
struggling families to pay their bills. In addition to the BAMA WhatsApp group, some mosque 
volunteers are also members of the Refugee Volunteer Network (RVN) WhatsApp group. The 
RVS group connects volunteers who are loosely associated with local churches, temples and 
mosques in assisting different refugee families. The BAMA volunteer relayed how people will 
post in RVS to “collect quilts, diapers and [even] washing machines” for refugee families. In 
contrast to BAMA, the WHOKE volunteer described how her group often struggled to extract 
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funds from its members to assist their refugee families. Specifically, she stated: “If you do a 
fundraiser at a giant synagogue, a lot of old retirees, the pockets are deep so families got like a 
check for $1,400.” While WHOKE did finance their families, they did not have the charitable 
backbone of a religious congregation. Nonetheless, the social capital of both BAMA and 
WHOKE provided refugees families with income to pay their expenses.  
 Similar to BAMA and WHOKE volunteers, the Forward CT volunteer emphasized the 
importance of social capital in facilitating their family’s economic integration. In particular, she 
stated how “the higher socioeconomic class of our volunteer base” made it easier for the group to 
network for jobs and cars for their family. Furthermore, the group “had access to things that 
potentially other people [volunteers] wouldn’t.” For example, Forward CT provided the father of 
their refugee family a job in a factory where one of the group’s volunteers is the CEO. While this 
refugee’s hard work and demeanor “got him the job,” the volunteer explained how the group 
“got his foot in the door.” In BAMA, as well, mosque volunteers’ employment connections have 
provided refugees with job opportunities. The BAMA volunteer explained: “[volunteers] know 
who has restaurants, and they’re willing to hire this person.” Indeed, private sponsors’ social 
connections have strengthened this family’s economic independence. 
 Private sponsors held different opinions on their families’ English proficiency and 
improvement.  The BAMA volunteer explained that families often came with different levels of 
English. Nonetheless, families whose members have disabilities often “struggle to learn 
English.” Therefore, these individuals need assistance from BAMA volunteers to accomplish 
communicative tasks such as scheduling medical appointments or meeting with school teachers. 
Moreover, in the WHOKE group, the parents of both refugee families have been consistently 
attending ESL classes. In one of the families, the father is disabled and the mother is illiterate.  
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Despite these challenges, WOKE volunteers have driven the parents to their bi-weekly English 
classes. The WOKE volunteer described how ESL acquisition has been difficult, but both parents 
have substantially improved their English. In the Forward CT group, the volunteer describes how 
both parents are highly-skilled in English. With volunteer ESL tutors, Forward CT has dedicated 
substantial time and effort to their refugee families.  
Challenges of Private Sponsorship  
 Despite the successes of their involvement, the private sponsors encountered several 
challenges in assisting refugees. The BAMA volunteer, for instance, explained how she 
conflicted with mosque volunteers and leaders over Catholic Charities. She explained how 
“mosque members do not understand how Catholic Charities’ case-managers’ housing placement 
and lack of involvement disadvantage their refugee clients. Interestingly, Catholic Charities 
works closely with the Berlin and Avon mosques to coordinate services and assistance for their 
refugee families. As a result, she has worked somewhat independently from BAMA to assist 
refugee families resettled in Hartford.  
With WHOKE and Forward CT, both women addressed their groups’ lack of training and 
coordination. During the first month period, the WHOKE volunteer described how volunteers in 
her group “went rogue.” Initially, WHOKE decided to introduce its volunteers in a slow process 
as to not overwhelm the refugee family. One of the volunteers’ acquaintances, however, decided 
to invite the refugee family to their house. While this visit was well-intentioned, the refugee 
family had to be driven home after a traumatic experience with the woman’s large dogs. Indeed, 
the WHOKE volunteer explained how this event could have been avoided with more 
coordination and patience in the group. Meanwhile, the Forward CT volunteer elaborated how 
her group “had no training and we kind of just dove in… to do what we thought was right.” 
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Unlike the IRIS co-sponsorship members, both private sponsorship groups had no background 
checks, professional oversight or cultural orientation sessions. As we can see, the private 
sponsorship networks lacked some important resources and mechanisms for assisting refugee 
families. To some extent, the initial interaction of the private sponsors with the refugee families 
may have been somewhat distressing. Nonetheless, it is difficult to ignore how the private 
sponsorship groups’ dedication and resources have substantially improved the refugee families’ 
integration.  
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CHAPTER 4: REFUGEE PERSPECTIVES AND OUTCOMES 
 In order to have an understanding of the implications of different resettlement models, it 
is most important to hear the perspectives from those being directly affected- the refugees. How 
are refugees faring in terms of employment, income, healthcare accessibility, English 
acquisition, transportation, and social-well being among other integration areas? Too often in 
policy studies, the voices of those being studied are omitted from research. My goal, therefore, is 
to connect the refugees’ resettlement perspectives to those of case-managers, employees, and 
volunteers.  In the previous sections, CC and IRIS case-managers, employees, and volunteer 
networks have shaped the discourse surrounding models of refugee resettlement. Besides from 
the Catholic Charities case-managers, IRIS case-managers and co-sponsors, along with private 
volunteer networks expressed the benefits of a community-based approach to refugee 
resettlement. In this section, Hartford-area Syrian refugees will discuss their resettlement 
experiences and outcomes in relation to economic, linguistic and social integration. Structurally, 
this interview analysis will be divided by refugees resettled by Catholic Charities and IRIS. In 
this way, we can assess refugees’ perspectives in relation to the case-management model, and 
private and community sponsorship models.  
Catholic Charities Syrian Refugees 
Catholic Charities’ Syrian refugee families, like their case managers, are a diverse group 
consisting of different ages, socioeconomic backgrounds, linguistic and educational levels, 
skillsets, and life experiences. In Syria, the refugee families lived in urban cities such as 
Damascus, or rural country-side towns and villages. Arriving in 2016 and 2017, the refugees 
came to the United States after spending two to five years in refugee camps or cities in Jordan 
and Turkey. Three out of the four families are married couples with young children and/or 
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teenagers. The other family, consisted of two adult children and their elderly mother. Together, 
the average adult arrival age was forty-three, but ranged from age twenty-two to seventy-five. 
Refugees arrived in the United States with a number of technical/professional skillsets ranging 
from cooking specialty dishes to managing technological data. Linguistically, the four refugee 
families’ English-speaking skills varied. In fact, some of the refugee families were illiterate in 
Arabic, or spoke other Middle Eastern languages such as Kurdish. Meanwhile, some families 
arrived with high school education, some understanding of English and even associate degrees. 
The families’ disparate cultural and socioeconomic characteristics upon arrival to the United 
States shaped their Catholic Charities’ resettlement experiences and integration outcomes. 
Table 4.1: Catholic Charities Families Interviewed  
Catholic Charities Families 
Family 1: Private-Sponsorship (Miriam/RAS and Forward CT) 
Family 2: Private-Sponsorship (Miriam/RAS and WHOKE) 
Family 3: No Private Sponsorship (Miriam/RAS) 
Family 4: No Private-Sponsorship (Miriam/RAS) 
 
The First Month and Catholic Charities  
 Together, the four refugee families described their general lack of understanding of 
American society when they first arrived. Interestingly, some of the refugees described how their 
pre-arrival perceptions of the United States stemmed from popular movies such as the Godfather 
or the Terminator. Consequently, some of the refugees were concerned with the shootings and 
crimes depicted in American films when they arrived in Connecticut. Once in the United States, 
however, refugees described having to start everything over “from nothing.” Many of the 
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refugees described their lack of or limited of English-speaking skills and, therefore, their 
inability to communicate effectively. Their lack of communication and cultural knowledge 
limited their ability to advocate for resources from Catholic Charities case-managers. One of the 
families described how they “signed” a lease, despite the apartments’ unsuitability, because 
“when you come here you don’t know what to do or the law. So you’re just going to do what 
they ask for.” With little to no social networks in the United States, refugees had to learn how to 
navigate life in the City of Hartford.  
 Overall, the refugees were deeply critical of Catholic Charities’ caseworkers and 
approach to resettlement in Hartford. Candidly, two of the refugee families told me that their first 
three months with Catholic Charities were a “bad experience.” When refugees arrived, they were 
placed into apartments they characterized as “dirty” and infested with vermin. One refugee 
described her disappointment with these conditions, “They [refugees] can’t live with mice and 
flies.” Two refugee families expressed that “living in a dirty place” affected their ability to “look 
ahead” to their future. In addition to vermin, refugees criticized the inability of case-managers to 
gauge their family’s medical and personal housing needs. For instance, one refugee with major 
cardiac issues was upset that his case-manager placed his family in a third-floor apartment. In 
another scenario, two adult siblings (sister and brother) were placed in a small one-bedroom 
apartment with their elderly, and sickly mother. Consequently, these three adults were unable to 
arrange comfortable sleeping arrangements for their first three months.  
Although refugees were mostly critical of their housing arrangements, they were also 
disappointed in their case-managers’ lack of welcoming and approachability. When refugees first 
arrived to the apartment, there was a lack of furnishing, culturally appropriate food items, or in 
one case, even heating in the middle of January. Again, this is a basic federal requirement for 
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resettlement volags.88 To fulfill these components, case-managers eagerly took refugees’ 
welcome money to buy food items, furniture and even a $80 blanket to “keep warm” in the 
refugees’ unheated apartment.  
In terms of responsibilities, refugees described how case-managers assisted with their 
social service enrollment (i.e. food stamps, SNAP, Husky), social security registration, and 
children’s school enrollment.  Nonetheless, refugees emphasized that Catholic Charities “did 
what they had to do” because they were legally obligated to do so. When it came to assisting 
refugees with daily tasks, case-managers were often busy, hands-off or ineffectual with their 
clients. To elaborate this point, one refugee recalled phoning his case-manager for a ride to his 
doctor’s appointment. In response, the case-manager told the refugee to “take the bus” and joined 
him in doing so. Eventually, however, both the case-manager and refugee got lost and had to 
walk two-miles in the August heat to reach the Doctor’s office. Recovering from recent heart 
surgery, the refugee emphasized the hypocrisy in risking his own health in travelling to his 
medical appointment. While this case-manager seemed to be promoting refugee self-sufficiency, 
his method in doing so was convoluted and tedious. One refugee individual described this case-
manager approach as “the blind leading the blind,” which he argued “set his family back,” not 
forward, in their acculturation.  
Private Sponsorship and Integration Outcomes 
Given case-managers’ limited assistance, many refugee families were left in precarious 
economic positions after Catholic Charities’ three-month resettlement period elapsed. In fact, 
many families lost welcome money through Catholic Charities’ security deposits for unsuitable 
                                                
88 “Planning of Refugees’ Arrival in the United States.” U.S. Department of State: The Reception and Placement 
Program. https://www.state.gov/j/prm/ra/receptionplacement/. 
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apartments. Although some of the refugees had employment, the jobs paid minimum wage in 
restaurants and clothing factories. One refugee stated: “They [refugees] were working in the 
restaurant. They have families, children. Restaurants do not give too much in dollars.” Dealing 
with the demands of their jobs, many of the refugees attended adult ESL classes, but were 
limited from focusing on English due to the family’s immediate economic needs. Despite these 
struggles, the refugee families were quite resourceful and looked for ways to advocate on behalf 
of their positions.  
For all the families, Miriam became the refugees’ main source of contact during their first 
months in the United States. The families described getting in contact with Miriam by meeting 
other Syrian refugee families in the Greater Hartford area. For instance, one individual stated: 
“We met other families who came as refugees here and they had communication with other 
people like Miriam.” While Miriam was a common contact, her level of involvement varied for 
each refugee family. In two out of the four families, Miriam assisted the refugees in relocating to 
West Hartford. In the other two families, Miriam encouraged housing relocation, but was not 
directly involved with moving the families. The refugees explained how Miriam told them their 
rights, and denounced Catholic Charities’ resettlement practices. In addition to relocation, 
Miriam assisted them by bringing refugees to appointments, jobs, and children’s events. 
Although Miriam is a common variable across all four families, only half received further 
assistance from private sponsorship groups. This inequity of private sponsorship coupled with 
the family’s socioeconomic background, directly influenced their integration outcomes.  
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Table 4.2: Catholic Charities, Private Sponsorship, and Refugee Integration Outcomes   
 Pre-Arrival Private-Sponsorship   Social Capital Employment English*  
Family 1 Jordan 
(Arabic) 
RAS (Miriam) 
Forward CT 
Volunteers provided 
refugee father with 
employment contacts.  
Husband/Father: 
Factory Worker. 
Wife/Mother: 
Homemaker. 
Proficient English; 
Charter Oak 
Classes and private 
tutoring 
Family 2 Jordan 
(Arabic) 
RAS (Miriam) 
WHOKE 
Transportation networks 
to attend Literacy 
Volunteers ESL classes in 
Hartford. Employment 
networks for teenage son. 
Both parents not 
working.  
Son: Working at Middle 
Eastern restaurant 
Basic English; 
ESL classes at 
Literacy 
Volunteers 
Network (LNW).  
Family 3 Jordan 
(Arabic) 
RAS (Miriam) Miriam assisted family in 
relocating to West 
Hartford.  
Brother: Data technician 
Sister: In-home hospice 
care. 
Mother: Not working. 
Advanced English 
Adult ESL Classes 
Family 4 Turkey 
(Kurdish) 
Some limited assistance 
from RAS (Miriam) 
Very little social capital. 
Initial transportation 
networks.  
Both parents not 
working. (Wife/Mother 
did work in textile 
factory).  
Basic English 
Adult ESL Classes 
*For ESL, I only focused on adult language acquisition. Most of the children spoke English fluently.  
 
Families with Private Sponsorship  
In addition to RAS, Refugee Family 2 received assistance from WHOKE, a West 
Hartford women’s group, and the other received assistance from Forward CT. The father 
described how WHOKE volunteers assisted in “getting the family out of Hartford” and into West 
Hartford for the schools. WHOKE volunteers also assisted the family’s teenage children with 
their homework and provided the man and his wife rides to the store, appointments and ESL 
classes. In terms of employment, the father had physical disabilities, and the wife held no work 
experience in Syria. Therefore, both parents were not working, and their teenage son currently 
holds a part-time job at Miriam’s Middle Eastern restaurant. Additionally, the refugees received 
some financial assistance from RAS and WHOKE given their lack of income and rental expenses 
in West Hartford.  
Even two years after their arrival, this family continues to receive considerable assistance 
from WHOKE volunteers. With ESL and school work, the teenage children received substantial 
support from WHOKE volunteers. In fact, when I conducted the interview, one of the children 
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was working on Algebra homework with a WHOKE volunteer. Given the family’s lack of 
transportation, volunteers also drive the parents to a specialty English class in Hartford, which is 
about thirty to twenty minutes away from the family’s residence.  
Since relocating to West Hartford, the family explained how they have became more 
involved in their community. Specifically, the children have become very involved with West 
Hartford’s Hall High School and their friends. For instance, the children frequently meet with 
their friends to play soccer, attend school events, and “hang-out” in the West Hartford center. 
The family has also become friendly with other West Hartford Syrian families by caring for each 
other’s kids, cooking together, and celebrating different holidays and events.  
Indeed, Refugee Family 2’s connection with RAS and WHOKE, has provided them with 
economic and ESL/educational opportunities that were not available through Catholic Charities, 
or in Hartford. In a better school system, both children plan on attending college to “assist their 
family in the future.” Furthermore, the parents attribute much of their children’s success to the 
school system and volunteers’ commitment in their academics. While both parents are not 
highly-educated, their bi-weekly transportation to their Hartford ESL class has allowed them to 
improve their English speaking skills. The private volunteer’s initial financial investment in the 
family, also allowed the family to move to West Hartford. Furthermore, the teenage son’s job, 
provided via Miriam, has allowed the family to receive additional income. Certainly, much of 
this success is also contingent on the family’s disposition and perseverance in adjusting to their 
arrival challenges. That being said, RAS and WHOKE’s social capital and economic resources 
have further facilitated the family’s success and integration.   
Similar to WHOKE, Forward CT and RAS provided Refugee Family 1 with assistance 
relocating to West Hartford. Interestingly, this family explained how there were very few Syrian 
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refugee families in Hartford “because everybody moved.” While it has been two years since the 
family moved to West Hartford, Forward CT volunteers are still frequently in contact. For 
instance, the refugee mother explains how private volunteers recently took their sick son to 
Emergency Care. Meanwhile, the refugee father explained how Forward CT assisted him in 
receiving his current factory job, which has “better hours, benefits and pay” than his previous 
restaurant work.  Furthermore, the refugee father was able to recruit other Syrian “friends” and 
provide them with better work for their families. Currently, he explains there are four Syrian 
refugees, including himself, working in this factory.  
Although the wife is not working, she has been improving her English with Forward CT 
volunteers. Initially, she elaborated about how she regularly attended adult ESL classes, which 
“were not very good” through Charter Oak. When I asked her why, she explained that the classes 
only provided basic English instruction for beginner speakers. In other words, she received the 
same lessons of “What’s your name? How are you?” over and over again despite her 
improvement.  With the private tutoring, however, the wife explained how the volunteers adapt 
to her improvement and included conversational activities in their lessons. Overall, she explains, 
this has been better for improving her English-speaking skills and communicative abilities. 
 In addition to employment and ESL, the family has become quite socially active in West 
Hartford. On a regular basis, the family attends their children’s school and extracurricular events 
such as teacher meetings, soccer games and swimming lessons. The family also attends mosque 
in Hartford and Avon, where they have become better acquainted with other Syrians in the area. 
Furthermore, the wife explained how she meets with other West Hartford Syrian women to 
watch their children. Recently, both parents also obtained their driver’s licenses and hope to 
travel more in Connecticut.  
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As we can see, Refugee Family 1’s relationship with RAS and Forward CT has greatly 
facilitated their economic, linguistic and social integration. With the assistance of Forward CT, 
the father obtained employment with better benefits, hours and pay than his restaurant job 
provided by Catholic Charities. His position at this factory also allowed him to provide other 
Syrian refugees with this job, thus widening Forward CT’s initial job placement.  In terms of 
ESL, the wife has received substantial in-home private tutoring allowing her to rapidly improve 
her English. If she had continued receiving “basic instruction” from Charter Oak, her ESL 
progression may have stalled. In West Hartford, the family has been thriving and becoming more 
involved in their community through school events, religious congregation, and social interaction 
with other Syrian families. In the future, the parents have even considered opening a “small 
business” such as a gas station, grocery store, or food restaurant. Indeed, the family attributes its 
success and adaption to American society largely to Forward CT’s post-resettlement assistance. 
The father stated, “Before we knew them [Forward CT], we have idea in our minds, American 
not as friendly, but not after we have that friendship with them.” 
Families With Limited Private Sponsorship  
 Despite the successes of Refugee Families 1 and 2, not all of the families receive this 
level of private assistance. The other two families I interviewed, Refugee Family 3 and 4, 
received some initial assistance from RAS/Miriam, but were largely left on their own to 
acculturate and adapt to the United States. Therefore, the refugees’ socioeconomic skillsets and 
background were almost direct indicators of their integration outcomes. Refugee Family 3, a 
three-person family (two adult siblings and their mother), received assistance from Miriam in 
relocating to West Hartford from their one-bedroom Hartford apartment. Interestingly, the 
brother was highly-educated and works as a data technician in Connecticut, which was the same 
	 102 
job he held in Syria. Meanwhile, Miriam assisted the sister in obtaining an in-home hospice job 
assisting their elderly mother. Instead of hiring outside care-givers, the sister receives 
competitive income and benefits for taking care of their mother. Indeed, the siblings’ level of 
employment are indicative of the family’s higher socioeconomic status and educational/ 
professional background. Therefore, both adult children, who are highly-educated, have been 
able to care for their mother, save their money and relocate (on their own) to a housing duplex in 
Newington.  
In addition to employment, both siblings have rigorously worked to improve their 
English. The brother attended the same specialty Hartford ESL class as Family 2, but went about 
three to four times a week after work. With a car, he could attend as frequently as he pleased 
without relying on transportation from Miriam or private volunteers. After four months of ESL 
classes, he moved onto the advanced level. He explains, “Everyone was surprised when we came 
there that we have good English, and there were people that were American, with citizenship, 
and they didn’t speak perfect English.” Given the family’s educational and socioeconomic 
background, they learned English quickly. In terms of social involvement and activities, the 
siblings are somewhat limited because of their mother, but the family is involved in “typical” 
weekend activities. For instance, on Friday, they attend mosque and on Saturday and Sunday 
they go shopping, eat at restaurants, and relax after working all week.  
 Compared to the other three families (even with private sponsorship), Family 3’s 
socioeconomic background and composition is somewhat of an anomaly. Both siblings are 
unmarried and without children, so they can work full-time in high-level jobs to save their 
money. While they must care for their mother, the sister is compensated for doing so. Evidently, 
the son’s higher education in Syria has allowed him to obtain a high-salary job and learn English 
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at a rapid pace. Although the family received initial assistance from Miriam in relocating to West 
Hartford, they have been largely independent since moving. Interestingly, the refugees’ 
economic independence has influenced their perceptions of refugee identity. The brother told me, 
“We’re just called refugees, but in real-life we’re just like Americans…we work and pay taxes 
and live like other Americans.” While this family has impressive integration outcomes, their 
success is not indicative of all refugee families without private assistance.  
 Refugee Family 4, unlike the other three families, still remains in their initial Hartford 
apartment. Interestingly, this Syrian family is Kurdish, therefore, their Arabic-speaking abilities 
are limited. While Miriam is in contact with the family, she did not assist in moving them to 
West Hartford. The father explained, “Not a lot of people helped us even though the people say 
that this is an unsafe area.” Although Miriam assisted the family with transportation and other 
services, their last contact with her was over six months ago. In terms of employment, both 
parents are not working and rely on “the SNAP program and cash and food stamps.” The father, 
is disabled and unable to work, and the mother is taking care of their year-old baby. While the 
mother initially worked in a Bloomfield clothing factory, the lack of affordable daycare has 
complicated her employment. The three older children, who attend Hartford public and magnet 
schools, are also not working. 
 As of now, their Catholic Charities case-manager is no longer providing direct care, but 
the father receives some health assistance from the organization. That being said, he explains 
how he receives very few updates from Catholic Charities and must take care of his own health. 
Specifically, he states, “If I wait for Catholic Charities to do everything for me, I will never 
move on.” Therefore, the father makes frequent visits to Catholic Charities, which is a ten-
minute walk from their apartment, to remind case-workers they are “still there.”  Linguistically, 
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the mother and father have been attending some adult ESL classes with childcare. The parents 
characterized the classes as helpful even though the English instructors do not have teaching 
certifications. The children, who attend school in Hartford, have quickly improved their English 
and sometimes assist their parents in translation. With the family’s new car, they have been able 
to move around the area with ease. That being said, there are very few Syrian refugees in the 
Hartford area to connect with. The father states, “Around here there’s no Syrian refugees, like a 
few years ago or a few months ago, there were some families but they all moved to West 
Hartford.” The family knows other Kurdish families in Hartford, but they have not recently-
arrived to the United States. In Hartford, the family are members of the Bosnian-American 
Islamic Cultural Center where they regularly attend mosque. On the weekends, the children do 
homework and the family goes shopping and spends time together.  
 Family 4, unlike the other three families, still faces substantial economic challenges. 
Dealing with disability and a newborn child, both parents have been unable to generate 
substantial income. In comparison to other Syrian families, the father states, “A lot of people get 
more help than my family…A lot of people are having a good life and we still need more help.” 
Indeed, the family’s private assistance has been very limited compared to Family 2, for instance, 
who also has two disabled/unemployed parents. Facing this inequity, both parents discussed how 
“the same people are getting more and more, so now other people [refugees] need to get the 
help.” This theme of redistribution is important because it magnifies families’ “randomized” yet 
completely unfair resettlement assignment. Why is it that some families receive more assistance 
from WHOKE, Miriam or Forward CT? Certainly, the existence of these refugee assistance 
networks are commendable; however, there are still refugee families who are struggling. Indeed, 
resettlement disparities and social capital play an essential role in refugee acculturation.  
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Refugee Criticisms of U.S. Refugee Resettlement 
 Based upon their resettlement experiences, the four Catholic Charities refugee families’ 
expressed different opinions about the United States Refugee Resettlement Program (USRP). 
Interestingly, three out of four of the families referenced European models of resettlement when 
describing the United States’ model.  In fact, most of the families’ had familial or personal 
connections to Syrian refugees in Europe or Canada. Refugee Family 1 and 3 expressed 
discontent with European countries’ model of refugee incorporation. In countries such as 
Germany or Norway, refugees are subsidized by the government and learn English for a year, 
prior to employment.  One individual from Refugee Family 1 explains, “Like they have to learn 
German if they want to work, but at the same time you won’t be independent.” Furthermore, in 
Refugee Family 3, one individual explained: “Middle Easterners like to be free” and in Europe 
“they just feed you and give you money with nothing to look forward to.” The same individual 
explained that when he came “he didn’t want to be dependent on DSS” and sought a full-time 
job for independence. It is important to consider that Family 1 and 3 are fairly self-sufficient in 
terms of employment, income and social services.  
On the other hand, Family 4, who still lives in Hartford, argues that the United States 
should be re-modeled after Europe and Canada’s Refugee Resettlement Program. Specifically, 
the father states, “It’s [Canada and Europe] much better than here, and the families get more 
help.” Instead of learning the host-country culture, the father explains how in the United States 
refugees must juggle work and learning English at the same time. It seems, therefore, that 
refugees’ socioeconomic background and level of economic self-sufficiency in the United States 
appear to influence views of varying resettlement models.   
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 In addition to referencing European/Canadian models of resettlement, some of the 
refugees mentioned their appreciation of America’s multi-cultural identity. In the United States, 
compared to Jordan, Syrian refugees described how they were not as singled out for their status. 
Because of the United States’ history of immigration and diversity, refugees do not feel their 
differences are as apparent. Nonetheless, in places like Europe, some refugees explain how they 
are more noticeable where everyone is a “typical German.” One refugee individual, in Family 2, 
explained how in his experience, his mother and sister wearing a hijab does not affect their 
treatment. While he emphasizes that “racism exists in all the world,” his family has felt 
welcomed in Connecticut. Surely, these perceptions may not be applicable to other parts of the 
United States or even Connecticut, however, some of the refugees describe how racial 
discrimination has not been an issue.  
 In terms of improving USRP, refugees were in less consensus. While the refugees agreed 
that Catholic Charities needs improvement, many were at odds about how much federal money 
and welfare resources refugees should receive. While Refugee Family 3 received relocation 
assistance from Miriam, they explained how “money was less important than psychological 
support” in the first month. Meanwhile, Refugee Family 1 conveyed the difficulty in balancing 
“making more money” while losing social service benefits. For Refugee Families 2 and 4, 
individuals expressed how welfare benefits and cash assistance has allowed their “family to 
survive” given their employment challenges.  
In addition, families referenced specific concerns with the USRP based off their own 
experiences. For instance, an individual from Refugee Family 3 described how the United States’ 
should make the green card process more transparent. In Jordan, he explains how his family 
faced the uncertainty of being “illegal,” and in the United States they just wanted to know they 
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could stay. Meanwhile in Refugee Family 1, the father argued that the United States should 
provide refugees more job training to prepare them for employment. Interestingly, he explains 
that for his factory position, he had to learn the U.S. Metric System, and had not been prepared 
for this aspect of employment. Together, refugees had many nuanced criticisms of the USRP, 
which seemed to resonate with their individual experiences. While the families were in general 
agreement that the U.S. should “do more” for refugees, their policy recommendations addressed 
many different areas of integration.  
IRIS Syrian Refugee Families  
 Compared to the Catholic Charities families, the IRIS refugee families’ resettlement 
experiences greatly differed in relation to community support and integration outcomes. Like the 
Catholic Charities families, however, the IRIS refugee families differed socioeconomically, 
linguistically and educationally. Between 2016 and 2017, all of the IRIS refugee families arrived 
after spending several years in Jordan. In addition, all three families were married and had young 
or teenage children. Together, the average adult arrival age was thirty-two ranging from age 
twenty-two to forty-one. The IRIS refugee families arrived in the United States with professional 
experience in manufacturing, restaurant management and education (among other areas). Unlike 
the Catholic Charities families, the adult IRIS refugees had no major health impediments or 
disabilities which compromised their workforce participation. Women’s employment varied by 
family with some wives managing their households, creating small business or working in 
professional daycare centers. Linguistically, all four of the refugee families arrived with little to 
no English-speaking skills. Moreover, the families’ educational background ranged from basic 
schooling, high school diplomas and even college/associate degrees. The IRIS families’ co-
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sponsorship groups were composed of West Hartford and Manchester Christian and Jewish 
congregations.  
Table 4.3: IRIS Co-Sponsored Refugee Families  
IRIS Co-Sponsored Refugee Families 
Saint James/ John Episcopal Church, West Hartford 
Family 1 
Unitarian Universalist Church, Manchester 
Family 2 
Beth Al Temple and Westminster Presbyterian, West Hartford  
Family 3 
 
The First Month and IRIS 
 When the IRIS families arrived in the United States, they described how “they didn’t 
know anything when they arrived” including the English language, U.S. law, and American 
culture. For some families, this lack of knowledge coupled with the unpredictability of their 
future was emotionally distressing. The wife of Family 3 stated: “When we come in the car it 
was very hard. Me, my husband, everyone was crying.” Nonetheless, the refugee families 
emphasized how their co-sponsorship groups’ welcoming and support facilitated their transition. 
All of the refugee families arrived to a readily-prepared apartment and fully-stocked refrigerator 
with culturally appropriate food items. The parents of Family 2 also marveled at how the co-
sponsorship group had provided each of their children with their own bed, space and toys. 
Together, all of the IRIS families’ described their first few months as “busy” with many co-
sponsor volunteers checking in, assisting with social services, and providing English lessons. 
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Furthermore, the volunteers each assisted the family in a “specific way” by “helping the children 
with homework, searching for apartments, or finding jobs.” Despite these volunteer structures, 
refugees explained how they could rely on any member of their co-sponsorship group for 
assistance. Additionally, this assistance did not cease after the first three months (Catholic 
Charities’ contractual obligation), but gradually decreased as refugees’ became more 
economically self-sufficient. Past their first year in the United States, two out of the three IRIS 
families were still in consistent contact with their co-sponsorship group. In fact, the wife of 
Family 1 stated how “nothing has changed” and she still has contact with many of the 
volunteers’ in her co-sponsorship group.  In the past week, she explained how volunteers had 
taken her children to the movies and ice-skating to celebrate their school’s winter break.   
While the refugees’ co-sponsorship relationship was helpful, there were some 
misunderstandings between volunteers and the families. In Family 2, for instance, the wife 
explained: “The group which they had was well-meaning, but they didn’t understand things 
about culture shock and where we were coming from.” In this co-sponsorship group, the refugee 
parents explained how the volunteers’ decisions and approaches were sometimes one-sided. 
Similarly, parents in Family 1 elaborated how their group’s volunteers could have been more 
receptive to their goal in opening a small-business. The parents of Family 2 also explained how 
the group treated their volunteering as a “job” which depersonalized their resettlement 
experiences. Facing a number of external challenges, Family 2 began heavily relying on Miriam 
for emotional support during their first year. Overall, however, the refugee families were greatly 
appreciative for their co-sponsorship group’s dedication, financial support and assistance during 
their first month in the United States until present.   
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Interestingly, most of the IRIS refugees were generally unaware of IRIS’ role in their 
resettlement.  The wife from Family 1 exclaimed: “I don’t really know what IRIS did for 
us…people helped us, not the organization.” Compared to the Catholic Charities families, IRIS 
families were less familiar with the role of the organization given their lack of interaction with its 
caseworkers. Indeed, the majority of the caseworkers’ resettlement tasks (i.e. obtaining social 
security cards, Husky Medicaid) were allocated to the co-sponsorship members. Additionally, 
the refugee families emphasized how they had very little contact with IRIS because of their 
towns’ distance from its New Haven headquarters. Because of Family 2’s particular 
circumstances, however, they were more involved with IRIS officials in relocating their housing. 
Initially, IRIS officials wanted to relocate the family to New Haven in close proximity to some 
of their relatives. Both parents, however, were extremely upset with the location and conditions 
of their apartment. They even stated: “We wanted to go back to Jordan rather than live like that.” 
Furthermore, when Miriam intervened in the family’s housing, conflict ensued with one of IRIS’ 
caseworkers. Ultimately, the family relocated to West Hartford, but Miriam and the family’s 
disagreement with IRIS complicated this process. Despite this one incident, families were 
generally detached or uninvolved with IRIS.  
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Co-Sponsorship Integration Outcomes  
Table 4.4: Co-Sponsorship, Social Capital and Integration Outcomes 
 Pre-Arrival Community and 
Private-Sponsorship 
Social Capital Employment English*  
Family 1 Jordan Saint James/Saint 
John’s Episcopal 
Church 
Volunteers provided 
employment connections 
for father’s current job. 
Husband/Father: West 
Hartford Factory worker 
Wife/Mother: 
Homemaker. Did work 
at a daycare.  
Proficient English; 
Charter Oak 
Classes and private 
tutoring 
Family 2 Jordan Manchester Unitarian 
Universalist 
Miriam/RAS 
Volunteers provided 
employment connections 
for both the mother and 
father’s current jobs.  
Husband/Father: 
Janitorial work at West 
Hartford private school. 
Wife/Mother: Artist and 
catering/cooking 
business 
Proficient English; 
Literacy 
Volunteers 
Network 
Family 3 Jordan Beth Al Temple and  Volunteers provided the 
family with a new car and 
assisted in placing mother 
in advanced ESL classes.  
Brother: Factory worker  
Mother: Homemaker. 
Advanced English 
Adult ESL Classes 
*For English acquisition, I only focused on the adults because the children were fluent.  
 While two of the Catholic Charities refugee families received outside support from 
private sponsorship groups (WHOKE and Forward CT), the IRIS families received assistance 
mostly from their co-sponsorship groups.  In fact, two out of the three families received 
assistance with jobs and ESL solely within their co-sponsorship group. The other family received 
initial support from their Manchester co-sponsorship group, but now receives periodic assistance 
from Miriam. Nonetheless, all three co-sponsorship groups provided the refugee families rent 
money, donated cars, and funds to pay some of their bills and airfare expenses. In relation to 
employment, all three families expressed their content with their current jobs. Currently, the 
husbands of Family 1 and 3 hold manufacturing roles in two factories in West Hartford and 
Meriden. At the factories, both men receive “good pay and hours” which allow them to sustain 
their families. Interestingly, the husband from Family 1 explained how his work in the United 
States is much easier and more structured than in Syria. Previously, however, both men had 
worked in restaurant jobs, which were arranged through their co-sponsorship group. While the 
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men were grateful for their initial employment, the husband from Family 1 explained how 
working at a pizzeria did not “offer benefits” or match his professional background in Syria. 
Consequently, he reached out to members of his co-sponsorship for manufacturing job 
opportunities, one of which is his current job. In searching for their second jobs (in the factory), 
the husband from Family 3 tapped into their own resources and social capital. Specifically, he 
networked with his Syrian friend who received a factory job from the Forward CT private-
sponsorship group. Through this connection, he obtained his current employment. In Family 2, 
the co-sponsorship group provided the husband his current position as a maintenance employee 
at a private school in West Hartford.    
 In two out of the three IRIS families, the wives held employment in childcare, cooking, 
and art. The wife from Family 1, while currently unemployed, worked in a daycare center when 
she first arrived in the United States. Furthermore, she explained how her co-sponsorship group 
assisted her in finding this job which matched her early childcare certification and credentials in 
Syria. In Family 3, the wife explained how she started her own Syrian food business outside 
Hartford Hospital, which operates once a week in warm weather. In addition to cooking, the wife 
is an artist who sells her charcoal works at local art shows. In all of the shows, she explains how 
her work “sells out” from all of her buyers. Unable to finish her high school education, the wife 
in Family 3 explained how she wanted to work like other “American women” and use her artistic 
skills, an area of school she had excelled in. With assistance from the family’s co-sponsorship 
group and Miriam, she has “made a name” for herself in the Connecticut art scene. As we can 
see, the co-sponsorship groups have bolstered refugees’ economic integration through financial 
support, professional experiences, and job networks.   
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 Linguistically, the refugees’ English improvement opportunities have varied by family. 
Across all three families, the husbands have mainly learned English in their workplace, not in a 
classroom setting.  The husband in Family 1 states: “I learn English because I go to work. I have 
more practicing.” In Family 1 and 3, both wives have in-depth ESL support and opportunities via 
local classes and private tutoring. In Family 1, the wife had in-home English lessons multiple 
times a week with tutors in the co-sponsorship group. Similar to the Catholic Charities families, 
she explained how private English tutoring has been more helpful because local ESL classes only 
emphasize the “basics.” She also elaborated how her children have taught her a lot of English 
through their school activities and homework. In Family 3, on the other hand, the wife has been 
highly involved in ESL classes offered through Charter Oak, a local West Hartford school. 
Recently, she completed Charter Oak’s highest English level class, and is planning to advance 
her English studies at Literacy Volunteers in Hartford. In addition, she explained how Literacy 
Volunteers provides daycare, and that she will be able to attend more frequently with her 
youngest child. In the future, she stated how she plans to pursue a GED and continue her 
education. Conversely, in Family 2, the wife has had less opportunity to pursue English because 
of her young children and familial commitments. Initially, she received English tutoring from co-
sponsorship volunteers, but the Manchester group has largely detached due to the family’s 
relocation to West Hartford. Despite her lack of formal lessons, she keeps a notebook where she 
writes and memorizes English words, phrases and verbs. During the day, she also spends times 
listening to “the radio, music and television” to improve her English comprehension and 
speaking abilities. With the exception of the wife of Family 2, the IRIS women have had many 
opportunities to practice and improve their English private tutoring and adult ESL classes.  
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 Socially, all three IRIS families have become very involved in their communities. Similar 
to the Catholic Charities families, the refugees’ discussed how they attended mosque, go to 
restaurants, relax, and meet with their Syrian friends on weekends. All the families, who have 
young or teenage children, attend their kids’ school events, teacher meetings and activities. The 
wife of Family 2 even told me how her daughter’s teacher called to tell her what an excellent 
student she is. The IRIS families, in particular, emphasized the interconnectedness of the Syrian 
refugee community in the greater Hartford area. For example, while interviewing Family 3, the 
parents told me how “tired they were” after attending a gathering at Family 1’s house the night 
beforehand. In addition, the wife of Family 3 explained how her children interacted with many of 
the other Syrian children in West Hartford. Many of the Syrian refugee women are also very 
close and attend English classes together, watch each others’ children and go out for coffee. The 
parents of Family 3 explained how in the beginning “they knew no one” and how now they have 
many friends through mosque, work and school. Indeed, car transportation and driver’s licenses 
have been especially important for the social involvement of the Syrian families. In two of the 
three families, refugees received donated and fully-paid for vehicles from their co-sponsorship 
groups. In addition, they practiced driving in co-sponsors’ cars to prepare for their license 
driving test. The generosity of these donations have enabled refugees to facilitate their family’s 
transportation within West Hartford and surrounding towns.   
 Overall, the level of social connection, resources and expertise in the co-sponsorship 
group has facilitated IRIS refugees’ integration into American society. All of the refugee 
families, even Family 2, emphasized how their group’s assistance, generosity and kindness has 
positively impacted their acculturation. The wife in Refugee 3 broadly stated: “Now everything 
is easy.” While the refugees certainly face daily challenges, the resourcefulness of the co-
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sponsorship’s volunteers has provided the families with mechanisms to overcome their financial, 
linguistic and personal obstacles. In Family 1, the husband described how he “could call anyone” 
and they would help his family. This level of trust, relationship-building and psycho-social 
support has further impacted refugees’ perceptions of the United States Refugees Resettlement 
Program (USRP).  
Refugee Criticisms of U.S Refugee Resettlement  
 Compared to the Catholic Charities families, the IRIS families had very few, if any 
complaints of the United States Refugee Resettlement Program (USRP). The husband of 
Refugee Family 3, for instance, stated:  
“I think the school is good, the people, I don’t see any problem. I live in the city of Jordan, I listen to a lot 
of the people, a lot of the people say they [the United States] don’t like Arabic, Muslim, I come here I don’t 
see this. I see a lot of people they help me.”  
 
All of the refugees underlined how grateful they were for the people and U.S. institutions who 
helped them in their resettlement. Similar to the comment above, most of the refugees 
emphasized how Americans were very welcoming and accepting of their families. The wife in 
Family 2 stated: I wear hijab. I look different. Everyone smiles.” Interestingly, two of the three 
refugee families explained how in the United States they were not marginalized as “refugees” 
like in Jordan, but were treated as Americans. In these interviews, the refugees praised the 
heterogeneity of American society compared to Europe. In France, for instance, the husband of 
Family 3, relayed how his brother’s family felt discriminated against on a daily basis: “Some 
people don’t like Muslims there.” Although all the refugee families were appreciative of USRP, 
they addressed how President Trump’s national policies have affected their family reunification. 
In Family 1, the wife discussed how her family and new-born nieces were still in Syria. 
Consequently, her family’s separation from their Syrian relatives has been very emotionally 
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distressing. Despite the gravity of these situations, the refugees spent very little time discussing 
President Trump’s travel bans and executive order.  
Economically, the parents in Family 1 were critical of the United States’ labor system, 
which underpays blue-collar, refugee workers. The wife explained: “Here, because you’re a 
refugee, they give you less than you deserve.” For this family, it has been difficult to pay rent, 
utility bills and expenses on a $14/hour wage. Furthermore, she explained how her husband had 
been working in a factory since he was 9-years-old and should be better compensated for his 
experience. In Family 2, the wife also explained how she frequently worried about providing for 
the family with the parents’ low-income.  Both parents in Family 1 also emphasized how 
refugees “want to work…they don’t want to take SNAP, they want to be more effective in their 
community.” Therefore, the “United States or IRIS” should be more supporting of refugees in 
opening small businesses. In the future, the parents explained how they wanted to open a 
Syrian/Arabic food restaurant and grocery. In comparison to European countries like Germany, 
the wife explained how the United States’ would be less committed in assisting them with this 
goal. While the family acknowledged the weaknesses of the U.S. labor sector, they were 
appreciative of their financial independence in the United States compared to Jordan. For 
instance, the husband explained how he worked “more than twelve hours a day in Jordan and 
couldn’t spend time with his children.” The wife also explained how she made only about $100 
USD a month for working in a salon. Taken together, the IRIS families’ opinions of USRP were 
less critical than those of Catholic Charities. Economically, some of the IRIS families addressed 
the hardships of poverty and in starting business endeavors. Despite these obstacles, the IRIS 
families greatly asserted the effectiveness of the United States in their resettlement experience.  
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Clearly, the experiences, outcomes and opinions of Syrian refugees resettled by CC and 
IRIS greatly differ. CC refugees expressed the hardship of their first months, and lack of 
assistance from their case-managers. With the assistance of Miriam, and private-sponsorship 
groups, two of the CC families expressed how they were able to “move out” of Hartford and 
pursue a better life. Meanwhile, one of the CC families described how their lack of assistance, 
and volunteer networking, impeded their ability to access resources to improve their integration. 
Meanwhile, the IRIS families expressed their appreciation, and gratitude for the level of 
assistance they received in their first months. Consequently, the perspectives of IRIS refugees, 
and CC refugees with private sponsorship, related to employment, language acquisition, and 
social integration were generally more positive. Together, however, the CC and IRIS refugees 
outlined how the effectiveness of their resettlement did not lie in agencies, but in people, and 
their connections.  In the words of the mother from CC Family 2, “Refugee resettlement requires 
a village.”     
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Conclusion 
Since the 1970s and 1980s, voluntary religious organizations have been largely resettling 
refugees in cities across the United States. The United States Refugee Resettlement Program’s 
main goals are refugee economic and linguistic integration, and consequently, self-sufficiency 
and independence in American society. To achieve these goals, most volag case-managers assist 
refugees for about three months, and expect them to learn the English-language, attain well-
paying employment non-reliant on public benefits. While some refugees arrive to the United 
States with advanced degrees, English proficiency and professional expertise, this is certainly not 
applicable to all refugees. In fact, there is no “single refugee experience” as USRP would have us 
believe, but a range of experiences impacted by refugees’ pre-arrival trauma and legal status, 
educational/linguistic level, familial composition, professional roles, and characteristics such as 
race, age, gender, sexual orientation and religion. In addition to refugees’ individualistic 
characteristics, community involvement, sponsorship, and volunteering in their resettlement 
varies by municipality. Nonetheless, policy-makers and academics alike have largely ignored the 
refugee resettlement system from within, and how state and local volags, communities and 
grassroots coalitions assist newly-arriving Americans. Although we have been welcoming 
refugees under USRP for nearly forty years, policy-makers do not understand how different 
models of resettlement affects refugee outcomes.  
In this thesis, I explored how community-driven approaches to refugee resettlement 
provide refugees with additional social capital compared to tradition case-management 
structures. Specifically, I analyzed how IRIS, a co-sponsorship organization versus Catholic 
Charities, a traditional case-management volag resettles and assists refugees with their economic, 
linguistic and social integration. While most refugee integration literature focuses on refugee 
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economic and linguistic integration, it does not assess the role of social connection in providing 
refugees’ jobs, housing, financial assistance, and ESL and educational opportunities. Case-
management resettlement, which relies on a single case-workers’ ability to provide refugees with 
all of these integration resources within three-months, is less focused on bridging social 
connections. In contrast, my interview data suggests that the co-sponsorship model and private 
volunteering networks greatly improve refugees’ access to better-paying jobs, ESL classes and 
tutoring, housing and educational systems. Despite the co-sponsorship model’s success in 
refugee integration, it does not address inequities of refugee resettlement and municipal 
segregation in Connecticut. Policy-makers and refugee stakeholders, therefore, must create 
mechanisms which equalize the “playing field” of refugee resettlement.  
Social Capital, Models of Resettlement, and Refugee Integration 
Economic Integration  
 According to prominent academic literature, community-involvement positively affects 
refugee economic integration (Breslow et Al 2017, Fratzke 2017, Ives et al 2010).  In fact, 
Canadian data on refugee economic outcomes specifically shows that privately-sponsored 
refugees find employment more quickly, receive more income from work, and are less likely to 
use public benefits (Fratzke 2017). These benefits have been attributed to the fact that privately 
sponsored refugees receive a level of personalized attention that government- supported refugees 
do not. While the United States does not have a national private sponsorship program, refugees 
in this study certainly received access to better employment opportunities in IRIS co-sponsorship 
groups or private volunteer networks such as WOKE, RAS or Forward CT. In fact, all of the 
refugees’ in the co-sponsorship groups, and several in the RAS and Forward CT attained 
employment opportunities via volunteer connections. Volunteers provided refugees with contact 
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information, interviews and opportunities to access better employment, benefits and income for 
their families.  
In addition to employment, co-sponsorship and private volunteers assisted refugees with 
navigating the social service sector and welfare benefits. Routinely, volunteers advocated to the 
Connecticut Department of Social Services (DSS) to reassess their families’ financial situations 
and welfare eligibility. Past the case-management’s traditional three-month period, community 
and privately sponsored refugees also received financial subsidization for rent, energy assistance 
and other household expenses. In fact, IRIS required groups to raise $4,000-$7,000 for up to six 
months of rental assistance in addition to refugees’ federally allotted reception and placement 
money. This financial safety-net allowed refugees to work and save their money to pay for future 
purchases such as cars or better housing. Volunteers also described how they assisted refugees 
with their financial literacy and budgeting. To promote self-sufficiency and economic 
independence, many groups encouraged refugees to keep track of their housing costs, utilities, 
childcare, phone and Internet service, food bills, insurance and other expenses. While Catholic 
Charities case-managers assisted refugees with jobs, they were less focused on refugees’ 
mobility within these jobs as opposed to their basic level of income. Catholic Charities’ provided 
refugees with their federally allotted funds and welcome money to finance their expenses, but 
disbanded when funds ran dry.   
Linguistic Integration  
While less research focuses on community involvement and English acquisition, this 
study’s community and private sponsorship groups provided refugees with flexible options, 
including adult classes and private volunteering. Several refugees enrolled in adult-ESL classes, 
while others opted for private tutoring because of its more individualistic approach. Private 
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tutoring allowed refugees to stay-at-home and be taught English in accordance to their own pace, 
schedule and goals. Given these groups’ large volunteer-bases, scheduling daily private English 
lessons was more feasible. The refugees who enrolled in adult ESL classes were also transported 
during the first year by volunteers. Indeed, volunteers’ time, dedication and transportation made 
teaching and bringing refugees to ESL classes more feasible. Although Catholic Charities 
promoted refugee ESL, refugees were required to “take their own initiative” in studying ad 
learning the English. In fact, IRIS’ case-management sector also emphasized how refugees were 
urged to take a job over learning English. Catholic Charities, and to some extent IRIS’ “do it 
yourself” case-management approach, may reflect USRP’s strict federal guidelines and time 
restrictions for volag organizations. In terms of formal English acquisition, as opposed to ESL 
accessibility, it is difficult to assess how models of resettlement affected refugee’s ESL 
improvement due to families’ differing socioeconomic and educational levels. Compared to 
Catholic Charities Family 4, who had no private sponsorship, it seems that families with co-
sponsorship had more ESL options. It is likely that this accessibility to ESL options, to some 
extent, may affect, English learning and proficiency.  
Refugee Resettlement Is Not An Equal Playing Field   
In addition to economic and linguistic integration, community and private sponsorship 
groups provided refugees with a number of resources to facilitate their acculturation in the 
United States. Namely, these groups resettled refugees in the West Hartford area either initially 
or after relocating them from Hartford. IRIS employees, refugees and volunteers alike 
emphasized how the West Hartford’s school system and public amenities, compared to Hartford, 
allowed refugees to thrive. Indeed, disparities of resources between West Hartford and Hartford 
have a long, racialized history of educational segregation, redlining, “white flight” and 
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discriminatory real estate practices. Consequently, Hartford’s population is much smaller and is 
composed of a larger, much poorer minority-population than West Hartford. Resettled in 
Hartford by Catholic Charities, Syrian refugees encountered urban poverty and institutionalized 
racism head-on in their first-month of resettlement. Many of the refugees and volunteers alike 
emphasized how refugees’ homes in Syria and Jordan were better than the “mice and vermin-
infested” apartments in Hartford. They also emphasized how refugee children “were not learning 
English” in the Hartford Public School System because “everyone spoke Spanish.”  
Consequently, many community and private volunteers moved Catholic Charities 
families from Hartford to the West Hartford area. Currently, West Hartford has a thriving Syrian 
refugee community concentrated in apartment complexes along Farmington Avenue. A lot of 
these Syrian families are close friends who attend their children’s school events, work together, 
celebrate holidays together and socialize on the weekends. Meanwhile, very few Syrian families 
remain in Hartford and the ones that do, explained how they were struggling to connect and 
integrate within their communities.  
These structural and economic barriers between Hartford and West Hartford, however, 
demonstrate the importance of community involvement in refugee integration. Specifically, 
Hartford Catholic Charities case-managers’  “Discharge from Day 1” motto is not a realistic 
approach for fostering refugee self-sufficiency in a three-month time period. This is especially 
true given the City of Hartford’s segregated resources, employment, and educational 
opportunities. Because IRIS requires co-sponsorship groups to raise $4,000-$7,000, the 
organization mostly recruits upper-middle class suburbanites.  This exclusive group of volunteers 
who have the privilege to dedicate time and money to refugee families become involved in IRIS’ 
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“community” sponsorship. Consequently, co-sponsored refugees are mostly resettled in 
volunteers’ suburban towns such as West Hartford.  
As this study suggests, volunteers’ social capital and connections promote refugee self-
sufficiency. However, resettlement is not an equal playing field for refugees placed in Hartford 
by Catholic Charities case-managers, and in suburban towns, by IRIS resource-laden volunteers. 
Indeed, IRIS’ Director of Co-Sponsorship even attributes co-sponsorship group’s over-giving as 
a reinforcement inequality. He states: “Some co-sponsorship cannot bear the thought of a refugee 
family having to really bite the bullet and make do with what they have.” With more of IRIS’s 
“co-sponsor clients living in West Hartford than any other place,” he explains how the model 
does not typically attract groups from the “inner-cities” and that there is no co-sponsorship group 
based in Hartford. While the suburban distribution of refugees disadvantages Hartford, it is 
interesting to note that Syrian refugees’ arrival in West Hartford promotes local suburban 
integration. In other words, more diverse groups arriving in West Hartford adds to the town’s 
overbearing native-born, white, upper middle-class population. Despite this possible benefit, 
however, many volunteers expressed their concerns in moving refugees from Hartford.  
Provocatively, the WHOKE volunteer questioned: “Eighty percent of refugee problems are 
poverty problems. Am I going to adopt a family in the North End of Hartford? Just to do the 
same thing for them?” In other words, how is the United States’ assisting Americans living in 
poverty to achieve self-sufficiency? Why is it that the government, and community volunteers 
are only focusing on achieving refugee self-sufficiency?  
In addition to highlighting municipal inequality, it seemed that some IRIS volunteers may 
be driven by some paternalistic intentions. For instance, IRIS Volunteer 4 explained how he was 
happy to be helping a family “escaping” the Middle East. While Syria is undergoing 
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humanitarian crisis, it is still one of the most culturally and historically-rich countries in the 
world. Furthermore, the Middle East expands from Egypt to Western Asia, an area which 
contains 18 different countries with their own ethnic, cultural, and political histories. Indeed, this 
generalizing viewpoint demonstrates the pervasiveness of some Americans’ views of 
“barbarism” and “incivility” in non-Western countries. It is also important to address how 
USRP’s warped notions of refugee “self-sufficiency” manifest into notions of “worthy 
citizenship” (Erickson 2012 and Ong 2003). Specifically, well-to-do, mostly-white volunteers 
who often assist, poor refugees using public benefits, reinforces a disparate power dynamic. 
Furthermore, this reliance on the “goodwill” of privileged volunteers with little accountability 
standards may not challenge ingrained attitudes about race, class, gender, culture and the state 
(Erickson, 2012, 174).  This neoliberal volunteerism, along with municipal inequities of the co-
sponsorship model, sustains disparate refugee integration outcomes. Catholic Charities and IRIS 
employees, case-managers, volunteers, and refugees, therefore, must address mechanisms to 
promote empower refugees’ resettlement experiences in diverse communities.  
Towards A More Equitable Model of Refugee Resettlement   
Policy-makers may be able to promote municipal and structural equity in refugees’ 
resettlement experiences though national co-sponsorship grants, Hartford-based refugee job and 
educational programming, empowerment of the state refugee coordinator’s office and volag 
oversight mechanisms. By creating a federally financed co-sponsorship grant, case-management 
agencies, such as Hartford Catholic Charities may be able to receive funding to create their own 
co-sponsorship program. Instead of recruiting co-sponsorship groups from neighboring suburbs, 
HCC can use this money to help fund co-sponsorship groups in Hartford-based congregations. 
While it is not guaranteed this would work, it may allow for more municipal equity in refugee 
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resettlement. Furthermore, in Canada, the Blended Visa Office Referral Program (BVOR), a 
relatively new program, which matches refugees identified fro resettlement by the United 
Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) with private sponsors, may serve as a 
model for municipal equity in refugee resettlement.89  The BVOR program is similar to a federal 
co-sponsorship grant because it “blends” government and private support- which relieves the 
sponsor of the half of the first year’s financial support.90 The reduced amount of money co-
sponsorship groups must raise may allow for more economic diversity in the realm of 
community-sponsorship. On a city-level, Connecticut could contribute money into creating 
professional training programs for refugees in cities such as Hartford, New Haven or Bridgeport. 
In the interviews, many refugees expressed interest in opening small businesses. Perhaps, 
through job trainings based in these cities, refugees can pursue courses/licenses related to 
catering, financial management, and small business loans. In this way, refugees can pursue their 
small business interests while simultaneously learning about economic opportunities in Hartford. 
Initiatives such as this, may stir refugee entrepreneurial energy and economic revitalization in 
post-industrial cities such as Hartford.  
Institutionally, both IRIS and Catholic Charities need additional state oversight mechanisms. 
Therefore, there must be more transparency within Connecticut’s Office of the Refugee 
Coordinator. Specifically, the Refugee Coordinator must become involved in reviewing refugee 
housing placement and landlord-case-manager relationships. Clearly, there has been very little 
oversight of this area for HCC refugees resettled in Hartford. Furthermore, IRIS co-sponsorship 
                                                
89 Sandeep Kumar Agrawal, “Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Programs: Experience of Syrian Refugees in 
Alberta, Canada,” Journal of International Migration and Integration (December 6, 2018), 2, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0640-7.  
90 Sandeep Kumar Agrawal, “Canadian Refugee Sponsorship Programs: Experience of Syrian Refugees in 
Alberta, Canada,” Journal of International Migration and Integration (December 6, 2018), 3, 
https://doi.org/10.1007/s12134-018-0640-7. 
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volunteers should also receive equity training as part of their “green light process.” Through this 
training, volunteers can understand the structural elements of co-sponsorship resettlement 
including: paternalistic volunteering, socioeconomic/racial inequality in refugee residency, and 
mechanisms towards evening the playing field of refugee resettlement. In relation to Hartford 
Catholic Charities, it is necessary that the refugee state coordinator ensures that the organization 
is realizing all of its federal-mandated requirements related to refugee housing. It is completely 
unacceptable, and illegal, that Catholic Charities’ is not complying with federal standards related 
to the provision of an arrival-ready, clean and furnished apartment with culturally-appropriate 
food items. While all of these policy proposals require political support, they would begin to 
address the inequities associated with different models of refugee resettlement. In this way, the 
social capital and integration benefits of community and private sponsorship, may be equitably 
redistributed to refugees and municipalities. In an age of travel bans and humanitarian strife, it is 
crucial that policymakers make decisions grounded in the realities of refugees and their local 
communities. As one refugee participant put it: “We are all refugees in this life,” and it takes a 
“community to raise us up.”    
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APPENDIX 
 
Appendix A: Informed Consent Form   
 
INFORMED CONSENT 
PBPL 498/ Senior Thesis Interview Information 
Models of Refugee Resettlement in Greater Hartford 
  
I, _________________________ (please print name) hereby consent to a research project, which 
consists of 12-18 interviews of approximately one hour that will ultimately be compiled with other 
interviews in an undergraduate senior thesis. Julia Tempesta, a senior at Trinity College, will use 
these interviews to understand the complexities of the United States’ refugee resettlement program 
in the Hartford area. 
  
Confidentiality 
  
I understand that my participation in this study will be kept confidential and will be used only for 
research purposes in the context of Julia Tempesta’s Public Policy senior thesis. I understand that 
my interview will be recorded and transcribed by the student doing the interview and he or she will 
replace my name before the thesis is formally published. The thesis reader will not know the names 
of the refugees/persons interviewed. The recording from the interview will be destroyed by the 
student at the end of the semester. 
  
Benefits 
  
The benefits of this project are that the interview participants have the opportunity to talk about 
their refugee resettlement experiences. This information will be used to offer policy analysis and 
recommendations to improve the United States Refugee Resettlement Program. 
  
Risks 
  
There are no anticipated risks to participating in this study, but I understand that I should only 
share aspects of my life that I am comfortable sharing. 
  
Voluntary 
  
I understand that my participation in this project is completely voluntary and that I am free to 
withdraw my participation at any time without any penalty. 
  
Contact Information 
  
If I have any questions regarding this project or wish to have further information, I am free to 
contact Julia Tempesta at (508) 250-2560 or jtempest@trincoll.edu. 
  
___________________________________            ______________________________ 
Signature                                                                   Date 
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Appendix B: Syrian Refugee Interview Guide  
 
Explain the informed consent form and have the informant sign a copy. S/he will keep a 
signed copy at the end of the interview.  
 
Opening Script:  
Thanks so much for agreeing to meet me and conduct this interview! Before we get started, I just 
want to let you know that your participation in this interview is completely up to you. With all 
these questions, share whatever you feel most comfortable with. At any point, we can stop if 
needed. Have a look at this form, and if you’re willing, go ahead and sign it to indicate your 
voluntary participation. At the end, you can keep a copy of the form. In addition, I will be 
distributing the $20 Visa Gift Card after the interview is completed.  
 
Recording:   
Read or paraphrase closely: I hope it’s okay if I record the interview? It’s an important part for 
coding and analyzing information for my thesis. Heba and I will be the only ones to hear the 
recording and I will destroy all files of it once my data analysis is complete. I also may jot some 
notes, just to help me keep track of ideas as we’re talking. Will this work?  
 
[If yes, start recording].  
 
Read or paraphrase closely: My senior thesis examines the role of different models of refugee 
resettlement in the Greater Hartford area. So a lot of the questions I have for you today will 
discuss your own personal experiences and opinions regarding refugee resettlement in Hartford, 
its surrounding towns/cities, and in the United States.   
 
Interviewer Notes:  
My goal is to elicit a 5-8 minute response to each of the following questions. The response 
should try to be complete full answers and non-binary (yes or no). After the informant responds, 
I may probe or clarify certain things s/he mentioned to flesh out the answer. Because I want to 
try to get through all of the questions, while also respecting the informant’s time, I will attempt 
to allot no more than 8 minutes per question.  
 
Part I: First Month in the United States and Resettlement Organization 
 
1. What was your first month in the United States like?  
a. Do not probe refugees to discuss their life in home country or Syria to prevent 
traumatic re-lived experiences. If refugees ask or begin to openly discuss their 
transition to the United States from their home country, explain that they can 
discuss whatever they feel comfortable with.  
 
2. Which organizations and/or individuals assisted you during your few months in the 
United States?  
a. Probe by mentioning IRIS, Catholic Charities and these organizations’ respective 
volunteers/caseworkers.  
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3. What kinds of help did [organizations/individuals mentioned] provide during your 
first few months in the United States?  
a. Probe by mentioning children school enrollment, public benefit enlistment, 
jobs/training or ESL tutoring.  
 
4. These days, what kind of contact do you have with [organization/individuals 
mentioned]?  
a. How often are you in contact with your [organization/individual]? 
i. [If continued relationship] Can you give me an example of a recent 
time when you’ve needed help with something and tell me about who 
you called? Are there other times you call on X?   
ii. [If not continued relationship] When you need help these days, who 
do you turn to, or what do you do? Can you give me an example?  
 
5. Other than [organizations/individuals mentioned] were there any other individuals 
or organizations who helped you when you arrived?  
a. Probe this question by mentioning churches, other refugees, civic/cultural groups 
or neighbors.  
 
6. How do you feel about living in the United States today, as compared to how you felt 
in your first month here?  
 
Part II: Community Involvement and Integration 
1. What do you or your family members do for work or employment?  
a. What type of relationships with people do you have at your place of work?  
i. Probe: Do you have a boss and/or co-workers you trust and can rely on? 
Do you have friends at your place of work?  
b. How does this job compare to past jobs, experience or education you had? 
i. Probe:  Have you learned anything new in the job you currently have? Or, 
does this job require the same skillset as past jobs or work you have had?  
 
2. What opportunities have you had to practice or learn English?  
a. When you arrived in the United States, did you speak any English?  
b. Have you had the opportunity to take any formal English classes? 
i. [If yes] What are these classes like?  
1. Probe: Are these English classes more classroom or tutoring 
oriented? What other non-native English speakers (refugees, 
immigrants or mix) attend these classes? What are the English 
instructors like?  
ii. [If no, or mostly no] What resources or individuals have helped you 
improve your English since your arrival? 
 
3. What kind of contact do you have with other families or individuals that live here in 
the Hartford area?   
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4. Outside of work and the home, are you involved in any activities or organizations?  
i. Probe this question by mentioning religious groups/congregations, civic 
organizations, sports/extracurricular activities.  
a. What is [organization] and its members like?  
 
Part III: Policy Recommendations and Final Questions  
1. What do you think the United States does well when it comes to refugee 
resettlement?  
a. Probe question by mentioning integration goals of refugee resettlement: 
employment and job preparation/training, English language proficiency, 
psychosocial well-being and educational attainment.  
 
2. What could the United States do better when it comes to resettling refugees?  
a. Probe this question by mentioning the same aspects as above (1A).  
 
3. When you think back about your experience of resettlement, is there anything that 
could have been done to make it easier for your family to adjust to life in the United 
States? 
a. Probe this question by connecting refugee responses to the questions above (1A 
and 2A) to their own experiences.    
 
4. Well, that is the end of my formal questions, is there anything else you’d like to add 
or circle back to in this interview?  
 
5. Are there any refugee families I should talk to or who would be willing to share 
their experiences?  
 
 
Thank you so much for your time in completing this interview.  
 
Here, I have a $25 Amazon Gift Card for your participation. Again, thank you so much for 
making my research and thesis possible! 
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Appendix C: Caseworker/Volunteer Interview Guide  
 
Caseworker/Volunteer Interview Guide 
 
Explain the informed consent form and have the informant sign a copy. S/he will keep a 
signed copy at the end of the interview.  
 
Opening Script:  
Thanks so much for agreeing to meet me and conduct this interview! Before we get started, I just 
want to let you know that your participation in this interview is completely up to you. With all 
these questions, share whatever you feel most comfortable with. At any point, we can stop if 
needed. Have a look at this form, and if you’re willing, go ahead and sign it to indicate your 
voluntary participation. At the end, you can keep a copy of the form.  
 
Recording:   
Read or paraphrase closely: I hope it’s okay if I record the interview? It’s an important part for 
coding and analyzing information for my thesis. Heba and I will be the only ones to hear the 
recording and I will destroy it once the assignment is complete. I also may jot some notes, just to 
help me keep track of ideas as we’re talking. Will this work?  
 
[If yes, start recording].  
 
Read or paraphrase closely: My senior thesis examines the role of different models of refugee 
resettlement in the Greater Hartford area. So a lot of the questions I have for you today will 
discuss your own personal experiences and opinions regarding refugee resettlement in Hartford, 
its surrounding areas and the United States.   
 
My goal is to elicit a 5-8 minute response to each of the following questions. The response 
should try to be complete, full answer and non-binary (yes or no). After the informant responds, I 
may probe or clarify certain things s/he mentioned to flesh out the answer. Because I want to ty 
to get through all of the questions, while also respecting the informant’s time, I will attempt to 
allot no more than 8 minutes per question.  
 
Part I: Involvement and Refugee Resettlement Organizations 
 
1. What brought you to working with refugees?  
i. Probe this question by asking if work experience, education or experience 
brought individuals to work with refugees.  
a. Are you bi-lingual or know any Arabic?  
 
Part II: Relationship with Refugees 
 
1. Can you tell me about the refugee family or families that you work with?  
a. [CASEWORKERS] Probe for how many families they are assigned and their 
degree to familiarity with each.  
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2. What is/was your role with assisting refugees during their first couple months in the 
United States?  
a. How would you characterize this time period for [caseworkers, volunteers 
and community members]? 
 
3. In your experience working with refugees, how does the relationship change or stay 
the same after the first couple of months? 
a. [CASEWORKER] How long do you stay in contact with your refugees you 
assist typically?  
 
4. [FOR CASEWORKERS] Can you tell me a little about [IRIS, Catholic Charities or 
other community organizations’] approach to refugee resettlement?  
a. Probe this question by asking for history, how organization is structured/run or 
participant’s role in organization. 
 
5. [FOR VOLUNTEERS] Can you tell me more about how your work with local 
refugees is organized or structured?  
a. Probe this question by asking about the participant’s role in the organization.  
 
6. If you think for a moment of a refugee family you know that has been in the United 
States for more than one year, what kind of contact do you have with them on a 
weekly basis?   
a. Can you give me an example of the last time you helped a family who has 
been here for more than a year?  
 
7. In your opinion, what resources or services are more important for refugee 
integration into American society? 
a. Probe this question by mentioning employment, English language, psychosocial 
well-being or community involvement  
 
8. When you think about the refugee families who arrived in 2016-2017, how would 
you describe their adjustment to the United States?  
a. What’s going well? 
b. What struggles remain? 
 
9. At what point has a refugee family achieved independence?  
a. When a family moves toward independence, how have you changed your 
approach to volunteering?  
i. Probe this question by asking how the volunteer/caseworker/community 
member detaches or separates themselves from the refugee family. 
 
10. When you think about your experience as a volunteer, is there anything you would 
change or do differently next time around?  
a. Is there anything that would allow you to serve refugees more effectively?  
 
Part III: Policy Recommendations and Final Questions 
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1. What have you learned from working with refugees?  
 
2. What do you think the United States does well when it comes to refugee 
resettlement?  
 
3. What could the United States do better when it comes to resettling refugees?  
a. [If they mention Trump or any of his executive orders]: How does President 
Trump or national policies in general influence local or city level refugee 
resettlement?  
 
4. Well that’s about it for my formal questions. Is there anything you want to add to or 
circle back to in this interview?  
 
5. Do you know anyone else who I should talk to or would be willing to share their 
experiences?  
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